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Introduction*
Security sector reform (SSR) and mine action occur in many different settings 
ranging from war-torn to post-conflict and developed countries. However, both 
fields of activity are most commonly implemented in post-conflict contexts. The 
United Nations (UN) Capstone Doctrine testifies to this view by listing SSR and 
mine action among the “critical peacebuilding activities”,1 alongside disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protection and promotion of human 
rights, electoral assistance and support to state authority. Mindful of this fact and 
the window of opportunities resulting from it, the present research focuses on 
post-conflict peacebuilding contexts. 
Despite their relevance in post-conflict peacebuilding, SSR and mine action 
seem to belong to separate communities of practice and the linkages between the 
two fields remain weak. This paper aims to address this disconnection by seeking 
to answer the following research questions. 
 • What are the conceptual linkages between SSR and mine action?
 • To what extent and how are these conceptual linkages operationalized on the 
ground? 
 • How could the interaction between SSR and mine action be more effectively 
operationalized? 
* The authors express their gratitude to Jakob Donatz for his assistance and support in the initial phases of 
writing this paper.
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The paper posits that SSR and mine action have a strong common conceptual 
basis, which draws from a shared understanding of security. They both contribute 
to a concept of security that is not limited to the level of the state, but takes into 
account security threats and needs at societal and individual levels. This common 
basis provides opportunities for synergies between SSR and mine action, by which 
we understand the possibility of achieving greater impact through improved 
interaction rather than actions implemented in silos.2 
However, empirical evidence demonstrates that linkages and interactions 
between SSR and mine action remain limited and underexplored. The respective 
programmes have a tendency to be implemented in distinct clusters, without 
much interaction. This paper argues that stronger linkages between SSR and 
mine action would be beneficial for both domains, and that the concept of human 
security provides a comprehensive framework which can bridge the differences 
and open broader opportunities for cooperation. 
The first section of the paper aims to demonstrate that SSR and mine action 
reflect a similar conceptualization of security – human security. The second 
section shows how this similarity is translated into a common theoretical approach 
in establishing and implementing programmes. The third section is empirical 
and explores how SSR and mine action interact at operational level, both within 
and beyond UN peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions. The conclusion sums 
up the findings and depicts how the concept of human security may help in 
strengthening synergies between SSR and mine action.
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Conceptualization of 
Security: A Broadened 
Perspective 
This section demonstrates that SSR and mine action contribute to the same 
concept of security, namely human security, and that the emergence of this concept 
influenced the evolution of both SSR and mine action towards a broadening of 
their respective fields of activity. The section also addresses the impact of this 
broadened perspective on security in post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 
and thereby how SSR and mine action have become essential programmes 
in such contexts. It lays the conceptual foundation based on which the paper 
scrutinizes the existing and potential interaction between SSR and mine action. 
Human security as a conceptual framework: Objectives and principles
Security has traditionally been understood as a matter of survival or 
self-preservation of the state, with defence issues such as border control and 
military posture at the forefront. In the post-Cold War era, civil wars increasingly 
emerged as the most common form of armed conflict instead of interstate wars, 
affecting more and more civilian populations. As a result, the traditional concept 
of security has widened and deepened, based on the recognition that insecurity 
might stem not only from military threats but also from environmental, societal, 
political and economic threats.3 
This broader concept of security has led to the understanding that individuals 
and communities should be the core security concern, and that the security 
sector should provide protection from both external and internal threats without 
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becoming a threat itself.4 In the words of former Canadian foreign minister, 
Lloyd Axworthy, “it has become clear that individual security is not necessarily 
the product of national security [and it requires] a shift in focus, from ensuring 
peace across State borders to building peace within States”.5 Logically, this leads 
to the assumption that the security of the state and the security of its people are 
interdependent, and the state is not secure when its population is not secure.6 
Human security also provides an alternative perspective on state sovereignty 
which, in its traditional sense, relies upon the government’s control over a 
territory, the independence of the state and its recognition by other states. While 
the human security approach of course does not remove state sovereignty, it 
reverses equation: The state is obliged to serve and support its people, from 
whom it draws, in theory, its legitimacy.7 
The concept of human security was popularised by the 1994 UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report,8 which raised 
the importance of threats to human rights, security and development in the 
efforts to fight poverty and improve livelihoods. The Report noted that human 
security has always been defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.9 
Political, economic, societal and environmental threats began to be addressed as 
threats to security,10 and led to the acknowledgement that the lack of security of 
people—and not only states—was a major impediment to poverty reduction and 
development.11 
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in depth the debate among 
scholars, practitioners and politicians on the concept of human security. However, 
it is worth briefly indicating that the understanding of what human security means 
and what it encompasses has not been unchallenged. In particular, some critics 
view an approach of “freedom from fear and freedom from want” as too broad, 
both for theoretical and policy-oriented reasons.12 Firstly, by considering more 
harms as security threats, it becomes more difficult to study the relations and 
causalities between them. Secondly, the broad definition can also be problematic 
for its use at policy level.13 This school of thinking suggests a narrower interpre-
tation that focuses on human security as freedom from fear, meaning the threat 
or use of physical violence. 
It was only in 2012 that the international community agreed on a definition 
of human security, enshrined in UN Resolution 66/290. This definition 
considers human security as an approach aimed at “identifying and addressing 
widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity 
of [member states’] people”, entailing among others the “the right of people to 
live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair” and entitling them 
“to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to 
enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential”.14 The backbone of 
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this approach is that security is people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, 
prevention-oriented and nationally owned. States bear the primary responsibility 
for ensuring the survival, livelihoods and dignity of their citizens. 
In the same resolution, the interlinkages between peace, development and 
human rights are clearly articulated. It is argued that SSR and mine action share 
many of the building blocks, goals and approaches of human security. Some 
stakeholders even perceive the global movement to ban anti-personnel landmines 
in the 1990s, with its emphasis on the humanitarian impact rather than the 
national security aspects of their use, as a starting point for the human security 
approach.15 In the following subsections the evolution of SSR, mine action and 
UN peacekeeping/building operations is analysed within this broadened and 
more holistic understanding of security. 
Security sector reform: Towards comprehensive security and good governance
The concept of SSR emerged with the end of the Cold War and has contributed 
to overcoming the traditional definition of security as a field limited exclusively 
to the military dimensions of state defence. In particular, as shown in Figure 1, 
SSR has produced a double broadening of the concept of security.16 Firstly, SSR 
broadens the range of actors typically associated with security by integrating 
other dimensions of state security provision besides the military. Secondly, SSR 
broadens our understanding of security by moving beyond the state as the only 
beneficiary of security to account for the security of individuals and social groups.
Figure 1: Holistic nature of SSR17
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Like the concept of human security, SSR thus reflects the need to address security 
concerns in a comprehensive manner. However, SSR does not consist only of this 
broader view, but also entails a specific focus on the management and oversight of 
the agencies and institutions responsible for delivering security. In other words, 
at the core of SSR there is not only the question of effective delivery of security 
but also a concern for ensuring that such delivery respects democratic principles, 
the rule of law and human rights.18 Ultimately, effectiveness and accountability 
are not separable, and both are essential for determining the nature and content 
of the reforms that are needed to achieve security for the state and its people. 
SSR has been recognized by many major international bodies and states 
as a crucial prerequisite for security, peace and development. Despite this, no 
generally accepted definition of SSR has yet been proposed, but it is frequently 
acknowledged that there is some convergence around the definitions put forward 
by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the UN. 
In its 2005 guidelines on Security Sector Reform and Governance, the 
OECD-DAC describes SSR as seeking “to increase partner countries’ ability to 
meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent 
with democratic norms and sound governance principles, including transparency 
and the rule of law”.19 In the UN context, SSR has been defined as “a process of 
assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation 
led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and 
accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and 
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.20 Although not identical, 
both these definitions have been interpreted as essentially agreeing on three core 
features of SSR.
First, SSR must be a locally owned process, meaning that “the reform of 
security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, 
managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors”.21 While it is 
true that what can and cannot be achieved by SSR efforts is often greatly dependent 
on local power relations and political will, it is also important to emphasize that 
local ownership is not synonymous with government ownership.22 Rather, it 
implies a people-centred approach that considers the needs of all stakeholders, 
particularly those in the most vulnerable and disenfranchised groups.
Second, the two main objectives of the reform process are enhanced 
effectiveness and accountability of the security sector. The former refers to 
the capability of the security sector to meet the security and justice needs of a 
country’s population adequately and ensure the overall well-being of the state 
and its citizens. Accountability denotes the manner in which security is provided. 
It entails the existence of checks and balances to safeguard against power 
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abuses and guarantee that all actors in the security sector provide their services 
in accordance with the law. The normative assumptions in this context usually 
promote democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector, transparency 
and the protection of human rights as indispensable elements of sustainable 
accountability.23
A final feature on which most definitions agree is that SSR employs a holistic 
approach to reflect the system-wide interconnectedness of security issues. It 
makes little sense, for example, to improve the operability of the law enforcement 
sector if at the same time mechanisms to interpret the law fail to meet even a 
minimum standard of accountability and legitimacy. In accordance with a holistic 
approach, reform efforts are therefore not limited to statutory security providers 
(the armed forces, police, intelligence services, etc.), but also engage with security 
management and oversight bodies (parliament and its relevant legislative 
committees, the government, including ministries of defence, etc.); justice and 
rule of law institutions (justice ministries, prisons, the judiciary, human rights 
commissions and ombuds offices, etc.); non-statutory security forces (liberation 
armies, guerrilla armies, private military and security companies, political party 
militias, etc.); and civil society groups (the media, research institutions, religious 
bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community groups, etc.).24 
However, this does not mean that SSR should always encompass reforms of all 
the components of the security sector. What is essential is to grasp that any SSR 
programme, even a narrow one, requires a comprehensive understanding of 
the security sector.25 Disregarding the holistic nature of any SSR process would 
lead to the “fatal mistake” of believing that effectiveness alone could “trigger 
commitment to good governance and a more comprehensive SSR approach”.26
From these three core features, it is important to emphasize three charac-
teristics of SSR that become important when we look at its linkages with mine 
action. First, SSR is essentially a political process because it touches on capacities 
and functions related to the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force.27 In 
fact, regardless of the specificities of the implementation context, SSR affects 
not only capacities in delivering security but also the control over and oversight 
of security providers, and consequently it impacts the balance of power between 
the state and the society and among political actors. The political nature of SSR 
explains why it is particularly sensitive in post-conflict contexts, where the state 
is weak and other actors have significant power and influence on politics. In 
such contexts, the challenge for SSR is to overcome resistance and manipulation 
aiming at preserving or increasing control over the security services.28 
Second, SSR is affected by the context, and “no one-size-fits-all”29 approach 
works. This characteristic is related to the political nature of SSR, and its implemen-
tation demands a profound understanding of local political actors and dynamics. 
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Third, SSR needs to consider a number of cross-cutting issues, like human rights, 
gender and financial management, as well as related processes, including DDR, 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, transitional justice and mine 
action.30 This need is the direct consequence of a broadened understanding of 
security, and more specifically of the SSR focus on good governance and people’s 
security. In operational terms, this means that SSR requires a wide range of skills 
and the adoption of a multidisciplinary approach – SSR measures are unlikely 
to succeed if implemented in isolation from other peacebuilding, post-conflict 
reconstruction and development programmes. 
These three characteristics show that the concept of SSR brings a significant 
contribution to the broadening of the concept of security and is consistent with the 
human security perspective. Thus human security provides a basis for identifying 
common features with mine action and potential synergies. Having reviewed the 
evolution of SSR in this subsection, we next analyse the evolution of mine action 
to illustrate how it has also moved towards a more holistic response. 
Mine action: From humanitarian demining to explosive hazard management
The UN International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – a set of sector-wide standards 
providing guidance, establishing principles and defining requirements designed 
to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness – define mine action as “activities 
which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines 
and ERW [explosive remnants of war] including unexploded sub-munitions”.31 
Consequently, mine action is not only about clearing land, but equally about people 
and societies at large and how they are affected32 by landmines33 and ERW,34 with 
the ultimate goal of reducing the risks to a level “where people can live safely; in 
which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints 
imposed by landmine and ERW contamination; and in which the victims’ needs 
can be addressed”.35 Nowadays, mine action is commonly understood to comprise 
five complementary groups of activities or “pillars”:
 • mine/ERW risk education (MRE);
 • demining, i.e. mine/ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance;
 • victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
 • stockpile destruction; 
 • advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions.36
The origins of mine action can be traced back to 1988, when for the first time 
the UN appealed for funds in a humanitarian response to the problems caused 
by landmines in Afghanistan. The appeal related to “humanitarian demining”, a 
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new term which was understood to mean removal of emplaced mines and also 
information and education activities to prevent injuries. The term “humanitarian 
demining” was used to denote mine clearance for humanitarian purposes and 
distinguish it clearly from the military activity of “breaching”, which cleared 
paths through minefields to attain military mission objectives during combat 
operations. 
The creation of the world’s first international humanitarian mine clearance 
NGOs in the late 1980s further accelerated the shift from military to humanitarian 
demining. Even more so, the growing importance of commercial demining 
companies following the clean-up of Kuwait after the Gulf War in 1991 further 
contributed to the affirmation of mine action as a professional civilian activity.37 
Today around 40 states and territories have established some form of mine action 
programme, while in some other states and territories mine action activities are 
overseen by the UN. 
Over time, the concept and scope of mine action have widened incrementally. 
In its earliest days, it focused on landmines exclusively. It soon became clear 
that other forms of explosive hazards and remnants of war (unexploded and 
abandoned ordnance) also had to be addressed. A later focus on cluster munitions 
as a specifically significant threat resulted in a further modification of the scope 
of mine action. The need to develop effective treaties and laws may have both 
reflected and driven the dynamic evolution of mine action. A well-defined legal 
framework emerged, with three principal instruments of international law: 
 • Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), with its Amended 
Protocol II and Protocol V;
 • Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC);
 • Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
The first treaty addressing contamination by explosive hazards is the UN’s 
CCW,38 which forms a framework treaty applicable to situations of armed conflict 
containing generic provisions and protocols relating to specific weapons and their 
use. It is built upon the customary rules that regulate the conduct of hostilities 
contained in international humanitarian law (IHL), including the principle of 
distinction between combatants and civilians; proportionality between the choice 
of military targets and the intended military objectives; precautions in attacks; 
and prohibition of weapons that are of a nature to inflict superfluous injury or 
suffering on combatants.39 In 1980 states adopted the framework convention and 
its first three protocols. 
Protocol II on Landmines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices reflected the state 
of customary law at that time by limiting the use of landmines, booby-traps and 
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“other devices” and requiring some general measures to be taken to reduce the 
dangers to civilians. However, the rules were later shown to provide inadequate 
protection to civilians from the effects of anti-personnel mines in particular, 
and in 1996 the High Contracting Parties amended the protocol; it now further 
regulates but does not ban the use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive 
devices. Under Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, adopted in 2003, states 
recognize the serious problems caused by ERW and commit to take remedial 
measures and all feasible precautions to minimize their occurrence and impact. 
Although the 1996 amendment to CCW Protocol II fell short of prohibiting 
landmines, civil society and pro-ban states took advantage of the momentum 
generated. They initiated a new process outside the UN framework, which 
concluded in a global ban on anti-personnel mines with the adoption of the 
APMBC40 in 1997. The convention entered into force in 1999, with the clear 
humanitarian goal of putting an end to civilian suffering from anti-personnel 
mines. To achieve this, the convention establishes an absolute ban on the 
production, use, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. In addition, 
it requires remedial measures such as the destruction of stockpiles, clearance of 
emplaced mines and support to victims. The APMBC has become the backbone 
of mine action and, with the inclusion of victim assistance, initiated a ground-
breaking normative development. As of January 2016, 162 countries have agreed 
to be bound by the APMBC, and many that have not done so do abide by its main 
principles and objectives.
In 2006 negotiations on cluster munitions were initiated within the CCW. 
In parallel, liked-minded states started a process reminiscent in several aspects 
of the negotiations which led to the APMBC.41 This process concluded with the 
adoption of the CCM in 2008 and its subsequent entry into force in 2010. The 
CCM comprehensively prohibits the production, use, transfer and stockpiling of 
cluster munitions, and requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions 
and the clearance of their remnants. It also contains detailed provisions on 
victim assistance. As of January 2016, a total of 98 states have ratified or acceded 
to the CCM. 
In addition to the conventions, mine action is regulated by IMAS. Although 
not legally binding, they provide guidance to mine action stakeholders and 
translate the principles included in IHL treaties, basic human rights and clearance 
requirements into practical and detailed norms. IMAS have become the relevant 
standards implemented by mine action organizations, and constitute the basis 
for national mine action standards. Mine action further relies where relevant 
on the 2011 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), providing 
standards for the management and destruction of ammunition stockpiles, and 
the 2012 International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). These two norms 
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reflect the trend in mine action to broaden its support to include ammunition 
and SALW. 
The various international treaties and standards lay a solid normative 
foundation, the extent of which might be missing for SSR. It is demonstrated 
below that the international obligations and IMAS provide useful guidance for 
the implementation of mine action, for instance in relation to good governance 
and the adoption of a human-rights-based approach. 
Initially conceived as a humanitarian emergency response, mine action’s 
focus was on safely and efficiently removing the threat of mines, cluster 
munitions and ERW to meet basic security needs of the civilian population and 
humanitarian workers. While this remains a key priority, it has been increasingly 
recognized in recent years that explosive legacies of armed conflict also impede 
the construction of infrastructure required for economic activity and mobility, 
and limit access to resources (e.g. water and land) and social services (e.g. schools 
and clinics). 
Figure 2: Mine action programme stages42
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Hence, beyond the immediate humanitarian concern, the importance of mine 
action for and its broader contribution to a country’s longer-term peacebuilding 
and development have enjoyed greater attention. This trend is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 2, representing the stylized transition stages of a mine 
action programme over time from conflict to stabilization, reconstruction and 
longer-term development. Mine action organizations and donors have started to 
place an increasing emphasis on ensuring that mine action achieves developmental 
outcomes such as access to basic services and improved livelihoods.43 
Another evolution of mine action relates to activities which organizations 
undertake beyond their traditional mandate. Although there are diverging views 
on whether such activities fall within core mine action,44 or if they rather represent 
related fields with which mine action organizations increasingly interact, the 
trend whereby mine action organizations address broader threats to safety and 
security is uncontested.45 
Threats to safety and security are globally understood in a wider – and 
widening – context, recognizing in part the broad threats of armed violence to 
human security. Drawing on their longstanding experience, technical expertise 
and capacities in removing and destroying mines and ERW in a wide range of 
conflict and post-conflict contexts, mine action organizations have in some cases 
evolved towards addressing other instruments of violence, such as SALW and 
ammunition, or even towards engaging with the agents of violence.
As conflicts evolve, mine action organizations respond dynamically to 
emerging challenges, such as the increased use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). As a weapon of choice for non-state armed groups, IEDs are used 
against military personnel, peacekeepers and civilians alike. Poorly secured 
and inadequately managed ammunition sites can fuel the production of IEDs 
and, as the UN Security Council expressed in Resolution 2040 (2012) on Libya, 
proliferation of weapons and explosives poses a serious risk to regional and 
international security.46 In addition, improperly managed storage areas with 
ageing ammunition represent a considerable humanitarian hazard, as testified 
by the number of unplanned explosions in depots located in populated areas, 
causing widespread damage to people and infrastructure.47 
Therefore, mine action operators increasingly engage in physical security 
and stockpile management (PSSM) programmes, entailing mainly training in 
accounting and munitions handling practices to enhance theft prevention, 
deterrence measures, demilitarization and refurbishing or building new storage 
depots.48 
This ongoing evolution of mine action actors towards addressing wider 
security threats related to issues such as IEDs and munition stockpiles is largely 
in response to observed needs on the ground and in recognition of increased 
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efficiency and effectiveness if the problem is addressed in a more comprehensive 
manner. Hence not only has SSR become more holistic, but so have mine action 
actors. The following subsection examines how peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
relate to a broadened understanding of security, and how their evolution gave rise 
to SSR and mine action becoming essential tasks in such contexts. 
The evolution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
SSR and mine action do not take place exclusively in post-conflict countries, but 
their definition and evolution are fundamentally connected with the promotion 
of peace. For this reason, this subsection shows that the broadening of the modus 
operandi of UN peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions is instrumental 
in identifying existing and potential interactions between SSR and mine action 
and grasping the importance of linking them in post-conflict contexts. 
UN peacekeeping has evolved since its beginning. Traditional peacekeeping 
was a tool for conflict management and relied on three principles: consent 
of the parties to the conflict, neutrality and impartiality, and use of force for 
self-defence or in defence of the mandate. This approach has been undermined 
by the rise of intrastate conflicts and the targeting of civilian populations, 
violations of human rights and IHL, and the multiplication of actors involved 
in a conflict. Thus traditional peacekeeping has been largely replaced by multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operations that have a wider spectrum of activities, 
including facilitation of national political dialogues and reconciliation, protection 
of civilians, support to elections, DDR processes and the restoration of the rule 
of law.49 In addition, some missions have become more “robust”, as illustrated 
by the establishment of the Intervention Brigade within the UN Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).50 
According to Ramsbothan et al., this pattern reflects an effort “to expand 
the traditional concept of military collective security … into an international 
commitment to use military force, where required, ultimately under a UN aegis, 
to uphold the wider concept of human security”.51
The broader spectrum of peacekeeping activities provides an overlap between 
peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in the first phases of a peace 
process, because multidimensional peacekeeping is supposed to play a “catalytic 
role” in favour of peacebuilding (see Figure 3).52 
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Figure 3: Linkages and grey areas53
The concept of peacebuilding was defined in the 1992 “Agenda for peace” as a 
response to the evolution and limits of traditional peacekeeping as described 
above. Boutros-Ghali’s agenda perceived peacebuilding as an action linearly 
following conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping by defining it as an 
“action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace to avoid relapse into conflict”.54
Peacebuilding as a concept evolved and was refined during the 1990s to 
become better integrated. More than two decades later the UN has initiated 
several major reviews of its capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, 
and while the implications of these reviews remain as yet unclear, it is likely that a 
closer analysis of the linkages between peacebuilding activities will be required.55 
Since 2001, the Security Council has understood the aim of peacebuilding as 
“preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and 
therefore [it] encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian 
and human rights programmes and mechanisms”.56 Despite its many challenges, 
the immediate aftermath of conflict provides unique peacebuilding opportunities 
in three mutually reinforcing dimensions: 
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 • basic safety and security (such as through mine action, protection of civilians, 
DDR, strengthening the rule of law and SSR);
 • socio-economic peace dividends (including the provision of basic services, 
economic revitalization and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and 
employment);
 • political reconstruction and processes (including electoral processes, transitional 
justice, good governance, basic public administration and promotion of 
inclusive dialogue and reconciliation).57
The evolution of peacekeeping and the emergence of peacebuilding came at a time 
when the concept of and discourse on human security gained much international 
political support. The trends in peacekeeping and peacebuilding as well as the 
emergence of the human security approach responded to the same security and 
humanitarian challenges and to the changing nature of conflict in the early 1990s. 
The thematic and time congruencies clearly suggest that the conceptualization of 
and narrative on human security reflected and supported the way in which the 
UN rethought its peace operations. Although anecdotal, it is symptomatic that the 
former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy proposed that building peace 
is about building human security.58 
Human security is especially relevant to peace operations when bearing 
in mind that peacekeeping and special political missions (also referred to as 
political/peacebuilding missions in this paper) are more and more required 
to link security and development efforts. What is more, a common pattern of 
intrastate conflict is the targeting of civilians. The trend underlines a need to focus 
on the human impact of conflict and the adequacy of a human security approach 
to peacekeeping.59 The question of whether stable peace can be achieved without 
ensuring human security at individual and community level is of course, simple 
as it might seem, of particular relevance.60 
The converging evolution of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in 
conjunction with the dominant role of the human security concept prompted 
the inclusion of SSR and mine action as essential elements in such missions. 
While the Security Council had earlier been involved in tasks related to SSR 
support and implicitly referred to SSR, it has given peacekeeping and political 
missions explicit SSR mandates only since 2004.61 This shift reflects the inter-
connected nature of SSR, increasingly recognized since the late 1990s in line 
with the evolving understanding of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the sense 
that political, economic, legal, social and security sector reforms have to be 
undertaken holistically to meet the security needs of individuals and communities 
in post-conflict peace operations.62 
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Similarly, mine action components have been introduced in many peacekeeping 
missions.63 More explicitly, the UN Security Council noted in 2003 the importance 
of addressing mine action in mandates for peacekeeping operations.64 That same 
year, through restructuring its mine action coordination center, the UN Mission 
in Ethiopia and Eritrea became effectively the first peacekeeping mission to 
incorporate an integrated civilian and military mine action headquarters in the 
mission structure.65 A review of current mandates is provided in the third section 
of this paper.
As for other peacebuilding activities, SSR and mine action support the 
prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding in its three dimensions listed 
above. Their contribution to basic safety and security may be the most visible.66 
Mine action seeks to provide physical safety, for example through clearance of 
contaminated areas or the reduction of stockpiled weapons and ammunition.67 
SSR aims to ensure that security provision is locally owned, accountable and 
effective, thereby contributing to building confidence in and strengthening state 
institutions, as well as to enhancing the rule of law and the security apparatus 
protecting the population. 
The contribution of SSR and mine action to peacebuilding also entails 
dividends for socio-economic development. Addressing the various peacebuilding 
dimensions simultaneously and in a balanced way is a challenge in post-conflict 
peacebuilding, but a necessity, since it is widely admitted that “there can be 
no peace without development, no development without peace, and no lasting 
peace or sustainable development without respect for human rights and the 
rule of law”.68 Thus it is often argued that an appropriately sized, accountable 
and well-governed security sector contributes to an environment less prone to 
violence, thereby improving both security and sustainable economic and human 
development.69 This refers to an even broader and demonstrated link that 
governance and effectiveness not only foster development but at the same time 
reduce the potential for conflict.70 
Interestingly, the debate on SSR in the early 1990s started among development 
donors looking at ways to improve the effectiveness of development aid. The 
positive effects of SSR in terms of improved safety of people and property, a shift 
of expenditures from military to development, conflict prevention and wider 
participation in decision-making on security provision came up very prominently 
in the discussions.71 However, the concrete developmental impact of SSR is subject 
to controversy. While it is assumed that the above objectives are at the core of SSR, 
it is less obvious that SSR has thus far been programmed with development goals 
in mind.72 In post-conflict situations it is apparent that SSR’s security mandate 
has been more vigorously pursued than its development dividends.73
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The contribution of mine action to development is more obvious. Contamination 
by or fear of ERW leads to human displacement, delays the return and resettlement 
of refugees and internally displaced persons, and blocks access to vital resources 
and social services.74 In response to the recognition of this clear interconnect-
edness, mine action organizations and their donors started to place increasing 
emphasis on the “security–development nexus” and integrate mine action into 
broader national development plans.75
Finally, some scholars and practitioners point to the primacy of the 
political aspect of peacebuilding,76 which SSR supports very directly. It is more 
difficult to demonstrate mine action’s contribution to the political dimension 
of peacebuilding, especially given the fact that in most instances traditional 
mine action has a humanitarian vocation. What is uncontested, however, is that 
mine action can play a key role in confidence building among warring parties, 
including through sharing information about minefields and conducting joint 
demining projects. This may serve as a foundation for conflict resolution or inject 
valuable confidence in the peace process with spin-off effects on reconciliation. 
With populations seeing enemies or former parties to the conflict clearing and 
removing the explosive hazards affecting them, confidence can be built or rebuilt. 
To sum up, SSR and mine action evolved from a narrow set of activities 
to more comprehensive action, and this evolution is grounded in a changing 
understanding of security. Also, the emergence of the human security concept 
is reflected in the evolution from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping 
and the growing emphasis on integrated peacebuilding. This contributed to 
the explicit conceptual inclusion of SSR and mine action in such missions. An 
understanding of this broadened perspective on security proves essential to 
examining the conceptual commonalities between SSR and mine action, which 
are the focus of the following section. 
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SSR and Mine Action: 
Common Approaches
The previous section describes the general pattern of the broadening understanding 
of the concept of security beyond the sole security of the state. This change is 
related to the development of the concept of human security and reflected in how 
SSR, mine action and peacekeeping/building operations are defined today. This 
section takes a step further by showing that SSR and mine action not only share 
the same understanding of security, but also have strong similarities in the way 
programmes should be designed and implemented. 
In particular, this section examines in greater depth approaches common 
to both SSR and mine action, and scrutinizes how these commonalities are 
articulated conceptually. This analysis prepares the ground for the third section, 
in which these conceptual linkages are tested against the operational realities. 
We identify national ownership and capacity development, good governance 
and a people-centred focus and human rights as shared approaches given their 
cross-cutting nature and relevance to SSR and mine action. They further reflect 
some of the founding elements of human security as defined in the first section. 
National ownership and capacity development 
SSR and mine action are steered by the assumption that concerned states bear 
the ultimate responsibility for both processes. There is recognition that for 
SSR and mine action to be successful and sustainable, national ownership77 
is sine qua non and commitment by national leadership indispensable.78 
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The legal-normative framework governing mine action is helpful in this regard, 
as it makes state responsibility a legal obligation. For instance, the APMBC 
and CCM confer responsibility on concerned states very explicitly, noting their 
obligation to destroy stockpiles and clear the territory under their jurisdiction 
or control. Likewise, IMAS enshrine this principle, stipulating that the primary 
responsibility is vested in the government of the mine-affected state.79 
The importance of national ownership is also key for SSR. United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2151(2014) “reiterates the centrality” of national 
ownership of SSR and “the responsibility of the country concerned in the 
determination of security sector reform assistance”.80 Yet because SSR targets 
the reorganization of political power structures and authority, SSR might be 
an endeavour with greater political implications than mine action. National 
ownership of SSR might thus be more sensitive, since it involves issues related to 
accountability and control. Hence, given such implications, national motivations 
for reform may not always align with the good governance principles promoted 
by SSR processes. What is more, aid providers could fear that their support to the 
security sector might be misused to commit human rights violations.81 
Armed conflict generally leads to a lack of governance institutions or weak 
and even illegitimate structures. In this context, national ownership might be 
illusory in an early phase and external assistance is usually provided to ensure 
the delivery of the most critical peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks, including 
SSR and mine action. While some authors caution the risk of aid dependency 
potentially leading to reduced efforts of recipient countries to help themselves 
and an inherent tension between externally induced, funded and supported 
initiatives and national ownership, such an institutional vacuum also provides 
excellent opportunities for setting up effective and accountable structures and 
building the necessary capacities from the outset.82 
It is often noted that a precise definition of national ownership in SSR 
contexts is challenging, due to the very different environments in which SSR is 
undertaken and the varying “stages” at which reforming states find themselves, 
especially post-conflict. In the same vein, the level of support needed by affected 
states in mine action is uneven: some programmes only require limited external 
assistance, building on solid national know-how and institutions, while others 
request more profound support. Leaning on Nathan’s conceptualization, the 
objective of national ownership might in both cases be that the mine action 
programme or the reform of security policies, institutions and projects is 
designed, managed and implemented by domestic, not external, actors.83 
With the involvement of international stakeholders such as the UN, 
international or regional organizations and NGOs at the early stage of post-conflict 
recovery, the issue of transitioning responsibilities to national entities is therefore 
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a critical, although delicate, process. In mine action this role is generally 
assumed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which manages temporarily 
– sometimes for years – a national programme while striving to accelerate the 
transfer of responsibilities to national actors at an appropriate time.84 However, 
transition has to be well timed so as to ensure that the capacities, institutions and 
structures are in place and sustainable. Transition can only take place and respon-
sibilities be assumed if there is a progressive “handover” process “through which 
the international community reduces its financial and technical support, as the 
affected state develops the required national programme management capacities 
that lead to national ownership. Successful transition will only occur when these 
parallel components have been reasonably effective.”85 
This definition entails building and developing national capacities to ensure 
that they are capable, empowered and adequately equipped to assume ownership. 
In post-conflict environments, however, the development of national capacities is 
often addressed as part of exit strategies of international interventions, whereas it 
should be an integral part thereof immediately at the outset. Both SSR and mine 
action actors face this challenge. This concern becomes particularly striking when 
keeping in mind that “inattention to capacity development constrains national 
actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between 
the State and its people”.86 
In mine action in particular, experience illustrates that it can be challenging 
to accommodate donor preferences for home-grown organizations and in-kind 
contributions, since this external support might not be the most appropriate in 
a given environment.87 In the same vein, Donais stresses a different, but related, 
challenge in SSR – equally relevant to mine action – with regards to political will 
from donors. Putting the concept of national ownership into practice requires 
donors to cede parts of the control and authority they usually tend to exert and 
accept a higher level of uncertainty.88 The issue of the willingness of donor states 
to lose part of their sovereignty over aid provision is, however, a more systemic 
challenge which also emerges in broader debates on donor coordination and aid 
effectiveness.89 
Good governance: Transparency, accountability and effectiveness
Another conceptual commonality between SSR and mine action relates to good 
governance. Good governance has been interpreted by development donors as a 
concept aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. 
It is widely understood to be composed of three key pillars: accountability; 
transparency, interpreted as freely available information, therefore representing a 
precondition for accountability and sound decision-making; and participation of 
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citizens, either directly or through legitimate intermediaries such as parliamentary 
representatives.90 
SSR seeks to apply the principles of good governance to the security sector 
to ensure that individuals and societies feel safer through more effective and 
accountable security provision. In this context, it is critical that security institutions 
work under civilian control and the rule of law, since the absence of accountability, 
resulting in an environment where security institutions can act with impunity, 
may often lead to political interference and human rights violations. The absence 
of accountability puts human security at risk.91 In turn, SSR favours security 
institutions under civilian oversight and democratic governance, gives people a 
participative voice in the decision-making process regarding security institutions 
and promotes a legitimate, transparent and inclusive state which is accountable 
to its citizens. SSR therefore has a substantive role to play in consolidating 
democracy and promoting human rights.92 Indeed, rights holders are not simply 
reliant on the good will of the state to deliver rights, but should participate actively 
in developing and implementing policies that provide for those rights.93 
However, “providing both security and democratic governance is not an easy 
challenge to meet”.94 Particularly in post-conflict peacebuilding, it is of utmost 
importance to enhance good governance in the security sector, even though 
a common error in programming usually gives less priority to the promotion 
of transparency and democratic accountability than to training and equipping 
security forces.95 
The three key good governance pillars also apply to humanitarian demining. 
Since mine action re-establishes access to vital resources, prioritization of tasks 
is an essential element of these programmes. During such processes a number 
of aspects have to be taken into account, such as land rights, political and social 
considerations and development perspectives. With a view to not doing harm 
nor creating or refuelling tensions, a legitimate, participatory and transparent 
process is required which will ultimately enhance good governance and ensure 
the enjoyment of human rights.96 The importance of participation in strategic 
planning is also essential to this goal as stressed in a recent study on this issue.97 
This clearly reflects the wider recognition that active participation from the 
population is the basis for any successful peace process. Furthermore, dialogue 
on security issues should be carried out with a gender and diversity perspective, 
as security might be perceived differently by women, girls, boys and men, as well 
as minority groups.98 Broad participation fosters ownership and the inclusion of 
local context and specificities. 
Mine action is often among the first internationally supported mechanisms 
in post-conflict environments. As such, it is a good entry point to promote good 
governance, with considerable spin-off effects on further structures in the security 
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sector established at a later stage. There can be a time lapse between SSR and 
mine action given the different phases of conflict when they begin, which can 
lead to some difficulties in linking the two sets of activities.99 Yet the potential for 
mine action to influence broader governance practices is still recognized.100 
Although each operational environment is different and a context-specific 
needs assessment is required, mine action may be more straightforward in 
terms of the possible institutional architecture than SSR. IMAS provide guidance 
on governance for regulating, managing and coordinating mine action, so the 
necessary institutions are put in place for states to assume ownership. IMAS 
generally suggest a division of responsibilities between a mostly interministe-
rial national mine action authority in charge of policy, regulation and the overall 
management of mine action programmes and a national mine action centre that 
has essentially an executive role.101 An example of a recommended national mine 
action structure is set out in Figure 4.
 
Figure 4: Mine action institutions102
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An unequivocal and transparent institutional architecture with clear responsibili-
ties, checks and balances is a precondition for institutions to be accountable. The 
set-up of institutions rests upon legal instruments, mostly national legislation, 
preceded by a political process involving government, parliament and agencies 
and offering excellent opportunities for inclusive participation. Ultimately, this 
kind of legislation is the source of legitimacy for mine action institutions and 
programmes. Accountability is further ensured in the sense that national mine 
action authorities generally report to parliaments.103 
On a cautionary note, Bryden stipulates that the set-up of internationally 
funded mine action capacities may also lead to corruption and self-interest, 
hence it is important to streamline parallel efforts to increase effectiveness within 
oversight mechanisms.104 The development of mine action institutions is a good 
example of potentially fruitful synergies between SSR and mine action. SSR 
could – or should – provide an analytical framework and expertise helping to 
understand the overall institutional security architecture and political dimension 
of mine action, as well as to identify critical issues and design possible solutions. 
Finally, transparency is key for mine action to serve as a confidence builder 
between formerly warring parties. In this context, the legal framework governing 
mine action comes into play and contributes to transparency and to the exchange 
of information. Both the APMBC and the CCM require States Parties to submit 
so-called transparency reports, initially at the moment of joining the conventions, 
and subsequently on an annual basis.105 
Good governance and its three pillars are intended to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. In concrete terms, being effective means for the security sector to 
meet the security and justice needs of the state and its population and for mine 
action to provide a safe and secure environment and access to livelihoods. IMAS 
again prove valuable. They establish a frame of reference and concrete advice 
on each component of humanitarian demining, with a view to improving the 
safety, efficiency and effectiveness of programmes and the sector overall. At the 
core of such an endeavour is the protection of those most at risk and it is this 
fundamental commitment to a people-centred approach that IMAS and mine 
action share with SSR and which connects both to human security. 
People-centred approach and human rights
Besides their ties to development and ensuring freedom from want, both SSR 
and mine action serve as a catalytic tool for the promotion of human rights and a 
life of dignity – another key element of human security. This subsection therefore 
scrutinizes how SSR and mine action follow a people-centred approach and 
support respect for human rights, including equality. 
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The link between SSR and human rights is of particular importance and relevance 
due to the fact that SSR mostly takes place in countries in which the security 
sector may have been a major threat to the human rights of their people and 
protectors have become perpetrators of human rights abuses. In the aftermath of 
conflict, security stakeholders can be feared and mistrusted by the population in 
an environment of impunity in which security forces are not held accountable. 
Despite these circumstances, the state bears the principal responsibility for 
international obligations such as human rights law. In addition to stopping 
direct violations of human rights, the state is required to create an environment 
conducive to the enjoyment of internationally agreed human rights by its people. 
Since the traditional security sector plays a central role in ensuring the protection 
of such rights, a post-conflict state cannot simply rely on a historically abusive 
security sector. To do nothing in such circumstances may be considered as an 
omission, and hence a wrongful act.106
At a policy level the linkages are clearly outlined, such as in the OECD-DAC 
SSR handbook where the strengthening of respect for human rights is considered 
to be a key principle of SSR.107 It is less clear, though, what exactly a state is 
required to do under international law in relation to reforming its security sector, 
and not much analysis is available on how SSR programming should actually be 
informed by human rights in terms of legal duty. International law does, however, 
provide principles to steer SSR work: the duty to respect and ensure human rights 
must entail due diligence to analyse patterns of abuse; states must investigate 
gross violations of human rights law and serious violations of IHL and prosecute 
perpetrators; and states must ensure that the victims’ rights are guaranteed. These 
obligations underline the centrality of human rights training and vetting, among 
others, and should clarify the objectives of SSR programming.108 In the same 
vein, a human rights approach emphasizes the relationship between the rights 
holders and the duty-bearer, while trying to adjust institutions or laws to make 
sure that the duty-bearer – the state – actually fulfils its obligations. According 
to Galletti and Wodzicki, this could mean in practice that SSR may need to shift 
from a state-capacity paradigm to a state-obligation paradigm.109 
In the context of UN peace operations, missions are required to apply the 
UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, which “sets out measures that all 
United Nations entities must take in order to ensure that any support that they 
may provide to non-United Nations forces is consistent with the purposes and 
principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its responsi-
bility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, 
human rights and refugee law.”110 The due diligence policy requires UN entities 
to assess whether security forces receiving support are already engaged in or are 
likely to commit grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or 
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refugee law; and, where this may be the case to work with relevant authorities to 
stop the abuses or ultimately end support. Applying the due diligence policy has 
provided an initial basis for a human-rights approach to SSR in the context of UN 
support even if much remains to be improved in this area.
The importance of a comprehensive approach to SSR in relation to human 
rights might be best illustrated by the 2012 report of the Special Rapporteur of 
the Human Rights Council on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence in the context of transitional justice. Accordingly, 
transitional justice should, for instance, include institutional reform or vetting of 
office holders with a view to ensuring non-recurrence of human rights violations.111 
This demonstrates the direct contribution of SSR to the respect for and promotion 
of human rights and the need for these linkages to be institutionalized, as proposed 
by the Special Rapporteur. In fact, should abusive security officials not be held 
accountable and simply recycled into reformed security forces as part of SSR and/
or DDR processes, the right to reparations and the state’s duty to ensure respect 
of international rights can hardly be upheld, while the legitimacy of the security 
sector – paramount for its effectiveness – continues to be eroded. According to 
some scholars, though, while the importance of human rights training and 
vetting is recognized in SSR at policy level, they are not necessarily understood as 
being driven by international legal obligations.112 Hence, as Galletti and Wodzicki 
articulate it, “by shifting the paradigm of SSR to a human rights perspective, SSR 
becomes part of the process to secure human rights”.113
Good governance and transparency are also critical to ensure economic and 
social rights. Excessive military budgets can draw badly needed resources away 
from humanitarian or development projects and may impede a state in realizing 
internationally protected rights. By promoting civilian control and transparency 
within the security sector, SSR can prevent or counteract such situations. 
Economic and social rights can also be violated directly by security forces, for 
instance through corruption. SSR again plays a determinant role in creating an 
environment in which the state can address effectively questions of corruption or 
other forms of economic violence.114 It is therefore essential that a human rights 
framework focuses on accountability, without which laws are powerless. This is 
certainly as valid for SSR as it is for mine action. 
Mine action follows a human-rights-based approach, given that mines and 
ERW can directly affect the exercise of a number of political, economic, social, 
civil and cultural rights. Without being exhaustive, these include the right to life 
and security of a person, the right to an adequate standard of living and the right 
to education, all enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
relevance of mine action to respect for the right to food can be exemplified by the 
report of the Special Rapporteur on food after his mission to Lebanon in 2006, 
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which demonstrates how mine/ERW contamination can severely decrease the 
ability of affected populations to feed themselves through an adequate livelihood.115 
Mine action and the removal of contamination by mines and ERW may also 
drastically improve the enjoyment of the freedom of movement.116 Hence any 
concrete mine action project on the ground contributes to re-establishing the 
exercise of an array of internationally guaranteed rights. A founding principle 
for the development of IMAS consisted in protecting those most at risk, which 
underscores the strong people-centred – and consequently human security – 
focus of mine action. 
In this context, assistance to victims merits particular emphasis. The first 
section of this paper redrew the evolution of mine action and the international 
legal framework surrounding it; within this, the rights of persons with disabilities, 
in particular victims,117 have gained increasing attention, not least because of the 
landmark provisions of the APMBC.118 For the first time, legal obligations to 
assist victims of a particular weapons system were included in an international 
instrument governing conventional weapons.119 It also expanded the traditional 
understanding of state responsibility, with states accepting that they have 
important human security and human rights responsibilities.120 
The CCW’s Protocol V and the CCM subsequently embodied similar 
provisions, with the CCM especially going beyond the APMBC requirements.121 
Since the ultimate objective is to achieve the full and effective participation of 
victims in society on an equal basis with others, this requires the integration 
of victim assistance into broader contexts such as disability rights, health and 
employment.122 In this regard, the entry into force of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities further boosted the attention given to victims 
by clarifying states’ obligation to ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights 
by persons with disabilities. As such, mine action serves in the application and 
promotion of human rights instruments. 
Especially the APMBC and the CCM provide a useful framework and guidance 
for the concrete implementation of human-rights-based assistance to victims. 
Beyond the obligations they contain, five-year action plans go into much more 
detail about actions required by States Parties. Not only do such plans ensure 
progress in victim assistance, but each review conference at which the international 
community takes stock of achievements also helps demonstrate the realism 
of state responsibility for victims.123 As an example, the APMBC States Parties 
committed in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan to communicate “time-bound 
and measurable objectives [they seek] to achieve through the implementation of 
national policies, plans and legal frameworks that will tangibly contribute, to the 
full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society”.124 
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Therefore, while both SSR and mine action have adopted a human-rights-based 
approach which could still be strengthened, mine action – unlike SSR – can 
rely on international legal norms and agreed actions which have embraced this 
approach. Yet despite this difference in the development of international legal 
frameworks, both sectors adhere to the principle that a human rights framework 
helps to secure freedoms and human development and to empower people to take 
part in the decisions that will affect their lives. 
For empowerment of people to be truly meaningful, the participation and 
inclusion of the society in its entirety on an equal basis and without discrimina-
tion is a precondition. Gender and diversity are therefore relevant to SSR and mine 
action. In his first report on SSR, the UN Secretary-General stressed that a gender 
approach “is key to developing security sector institutions that are non-discrimi-
natory, representative of the population and capable of effectively responding to 
the specific security needs of diverse groups”.125 This is based on the recognition 
that women, girls, boys and men as well as minority groups experience security 
and insecurity in different ways. Likewise, the OECD-DAC SSR handbook 
underscores that the comprehensive integration of gender equality dimensions 
into SSR is of central importance to ensure local ownership, oversight, accounta-
bility and not least effective provision of security.126 
Improved inclusion of women and marginalized groups can be supported, 
for example, by their participation in SSR planning or through structural reforms 
targeting personnel practices (e.g. recruitment).127 Inclusive security sector 
institutions, which represent the diversity of societies at large are more likely to be 
trusted and perceived as legitimate, as well as more effective in their mission but 
these benefits require the security forces be appropriately diverse and represent-
ative in their composition.128 The need to develop gender- and identity- specific 
indicators and to collect disaggregated data is thus given high priority in SSR. 
On the mine action side, as for SSR, elements such as inclusive planning, 
recruitment practices and collecting and analysing disaggregated data are 
cross-cutting and, as for SSR, conducive to improved effectiveness in programmes. 
It is therefore not surprising that the well-developed legal-normative framework in 
mine action provides a powerful awareness of gender and diversity requirements. 
Indeed, a gender and diversity lens has been embedded in, for instance, the 
CCM and the Maputo Action Plan, and emphasizes the need for gender-sensi-
tive clearance, MRE and victim assistance.129 Furthermore, IMAS specify more 
detailed requirements for a gender and diversity perspective in all aspects of mine 
action, including planning, implementation and monitoring. 
Concretely, disaggregation of information by identity categories, including 
gender and age, enhances the prioritization and planning of mine action work 
and allows activities, including MRE, to be tailored according to gender-specific 
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exposure to risk and mobility patterns.130 Moreover, as in SSR, employment and 
training opportunities in mine action should be provided to women and men 
without discrimination. In many cultures it is not appropriate for women to 
interact with men outside their immediate families. Having women and men 
working in survey teams (tasked with collecting information from affected 
communities regarding the location of mines/ERW), for example, is essential, 
since it enables them to access and reach out to affected women and girls and make 
information-gathering processes more effective. This enhances the effectiveness, 
accountability and responsiveness of mine action and the same principles also 
apply to the work of the security sector more broadly.
Armed conflict can both catalyse change in gender norms and entrench 
discrimination. Ultimately, both SSR and mine action strive to change mentalities 
and institutional cultures, promoting equality and ensuring that entrenched 
discrimination is not perpetuated in a post-conflict environment or a reformed 
security sector.131 SSR and mine action can be inclusive and effective only when 
meeting the differing security needs of all people. There are clear gender- and diver-
sity-related linkages between SSR and mine action, as the key principles of gender 
mainstreaming and equal participation of all social groups apply to both fields. 
In sum, this section shows that some of the foundational elements of human 
security as defined in the first section are translated into principles that shape 
the SSR and mine action approaches to programme design and implementation. 
In particular, there are strong conceptual commonalities between SSR and mine 
action related to national ownership and capacity development, good governance, 
a people-centred focus and human rights. These cross-cutting approaches 
provide for substantive overlap between how SSR and mine action are conceptu-
alized. Because of these overlaps it could be expected that linking SSR and mine 
action in operational terms would offer enhanced opportunities to improve good 
governance, protect human rights and provide for human security. Yet to date, 
mine action and SSR have developed as discrete areas of operational and policy 
interest with relatively few efforts made to operationalize the conceptual linkages 
between the two agendas. The following section examines to what extent these 
conceptual linkages are reflected in operational terms and what might be gained 
from drawing them closer together. 
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Operationalizing Linkages 
between SSR and Mine 
Action 
This section examines whether the conceptual commonalities between SSR and 
mine action so far discussed are operationalized in the field. It first looks at UN 
peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions, as they play a critical role in 
conducting SSR and mine action in post-conflict environments. In particular, it 
enquires how frequently SSR and mine action are in the mandates of these missions 
and whether there is a significant connection between them. Subsequently, the 
section broadens its perspective by considering examples of SSR and mine action 
beyond UN missions, because bilateral programmes implemented by states or 
NGOs also play an important role in post-conflict peacebuilding and may provide 
further evidence of how the conceptual commonalities between the two fields are 
translated into practice. 
SSR and mine action in the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions
As shown in the first section, UN peacekeeping missions have become integrated 
and multidimensional and play a “catalytic role” in favour of important 
peacebuilding activities, including SSR and mine action. As of August 2015, a 
review of the current peacekeeping and special political missions132 shows that out 
of 25 missions, 14 mandates contain tasks related to SSR, eight are peacekeeping 
missions and six are political/peacebuilding missions. Among the 25 missions, 
14 also have an explicit or implicit133 reference to mine action activities in their 
mandates. Finally, ten missions have tasks in both SSR and mine action. 
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Table 1: Overview of peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions134
These figures substantiate the claim that the conceptual overlaps between SSR and 
mine action translate directly into operational contexts. Closer examination reveals 
the concrete issues on which SSR and mine action do—and do not—interact. 
Starting with the peacekeeping missions, eight have a mandate in SSR and 
all are stabilization missions (see Table 2). Six have explicit tasks in SSR that 
consist mainly of assisting the re-establishment and/or strengthening of a state’s 
institutions through advice and coordination of other international efforts in 
SSR. Often, SSR activities are related to a peace agreement, which provides the 
objective of the reforms and the specific security sector components that have 
to be reformed. For instance, the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is tasked 
to “support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the 
Agreement [on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali] … and to coordinate international 
efforts … to rebuild the Malian security sector, within the framework set out by 
the Agreement”.135 
In our view, the list of peacekeeping missions encompassing SSR in their 
mandates includes two other missions – UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) and 
UNAMID (African Union/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur) – since their mandates 
refer to tasks that are related implicitly to one or more components of an SSR 
process. UNMIK has to provide an interim and transitional administration 
“while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions”.136 In addition, it is tasked to promote, organize and 
oversee the development of provisional democratic institutions and, pending a 
final settlement on the status of Kosovo, it is in charge of civil order, including 
establishing the local police.137 Concerning UNAMID, its second strategic priority 
consists of mediating between the government of Sudan and armed groups based 
on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur,138 and the mission is encouraged 
to “engage fully in support of the implementation” of this document,139 which 
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Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in the Central African Republic
– X X – – X X
MINUSMA
UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali
– X X – X – X
MINUSTAH
UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti
– X X – – – –
MONUSCO
UN Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC
– X X – X – X
UNAMID
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur
– X – X X – X
UNMIK
UN Mission in Kosovo – X – X X – X
UNISFA
UN Interim Security Force for 
Abyei
– X – – X142 – –
UNMIL
UN Mission in Liberia – X X – – X X
UNMISS
UN Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan
– X – – X143 – –
UNOCI
UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
– X X – – X X
MINURSO
UN Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara
X – – – X144 – –
UNDOF
UN Disengagement Observer 
Force
X – – – – – –
UNFICYP
UN Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus
X – – – – – –
UNIFIL
UN Interim Force in Lebanon X – – – – X
145 –
UNMOGIP
UN Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan
X – – – – – –
UNTSO
UN Truce Supervision 
Organization
X – – – – – –
Total 6 10 6 2 7 4 7
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Among these eight peacekeeping missions, seven do also have tasks in mine 
action. Four of them (MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID and UNMIK) have in 
their mandates tasks related to core mine action activities. Three other missions 
can be considered as implicitly related to mine action (MINUSCA, UNMIL and 
UNOCI) because they support mine action actors in achieving their objectives 
and/or encompass activities in PSSM. 
 • MINUSMA’s mandate refers to mine action under the task of protection of 
civilians, and has to “assist the Malian authorities with the removal and 
destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition 
management”.146 
 • MONUSCO is tasked to “mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after 
any military operation”.147 These risks include ERW, and UNMAS provides 
MRE, risk assessment and clearance. In addition, UNMAS provides support 
to stabilization by building capacities of national institutions to deal with 
contamination, collecting and destroying weapons during the DDR process and 
providing support to overall SALW management. Finally, in relation to the Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework, UNMAS supports national ownership by 
establishing weapons and ammunition depots and training security personnel 
in safe management.148
 • UNAMID integrates mine action under the task of protection of civilians 
and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which constitutes the 
mission’s second strategic priority. The threat to civilians posed by unexploded 
ordnance is an indicator of this strategic priority.149 
 • UNMIK’s mandate includes the task of “supervising demining until the 
international presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility”.150 
 • MINUSCA has to “seize and collect arms and any related material the transfer 
of which into the CAR [Central African Republic] violates the measures imposed 
by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 and to record and dispose of such arms 
and related materiel as appropriate”.151 The mandate also calls on national and 
international stakeholders to coordinate with MINUSCA in ensuring “safe 
and effective management, storage and security of stockpiles of small arms 
and light weapons, and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, 
unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition”, and “further stresses the 
importance of incorporating such elements into SSR and DDR programmes”.152 
 • UNMIL is mandated to collect and destroy arms and ammunition within the 
DDR programme.153 This task is part of the support provided to the implemen-
tation of the ceasefire agreement, and includes the establishment of security 
conditions for humanitarian assistance.
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 • Finally, UNOCI’s mandate requests the mission to assist the government 
of Côte d’Ivoire in “collecting and storing arms and registering all relevant 
information related to those arms”.154 To fulfil this task, the mandate calls on the 
government to give the mission access to stores of “all weapons, ammunition 
and related materiel of all armed security forces”.155 This request is related to the 
effective management of arms and ammunition, which plays an important role 
in the stabilization of the country in conjunction with SSR and DDR.156 Mine 
action involvement in these activities is confirmed by UNMAS, which provides 
assistance to UNOCI in the field of protection of civilians, DDR and the reform 
of the country’s security institutions.157 
The review of peacekeeping missions’ mandates shows that mine action and 
SSR are regularly related to the protection of civilians, establishment of a secure 
environment for delivering humanitarian assistance and DDR.158 It also confirms 
the increasing importance of PSSM in relation to DDR processes. Of particular 
interest is MINUSCA’s mandate, because it clearly emphasizes the need to connect 
PSSM with the SSR programme – a connection we also find in MONUSCO and 
UNOCI, and which testifies to a growing awareness of the need to address PSSM 
as a governance issue. 
However, we are of the opinion that linkages remain limited between SSR 
and mine action for three reasons. First, mine action is mostly included in 
the mandates under the task of protection of civilians and providing a secure 
environment for delivering humanitarian assistance, and there is no significant 
linkage with the establishment of mine action institutions, which is a governance 
issue and is related to effectiveness and accountability. Second, mine action and 
SSR are mainly connected through PSSM activities and do not include some core 
mine action activities (MRE and victim assistance). Third, the linkage through 
human rights issues, which are related to mine action through the conventions, 
is absent despite the fact that they potentially support the promotion of justice 
and accountability. The general impression is that SSR and mine action are rather 
conducted in parallel, and there is no use of the entire spectrum of possible joint 
activities. 
The assessment of the linkages between SSR and mine action requires 
looking at political/peacebuilding missions, which have expanded since the end 
of the Cold War. There are nine political/peacebuilding missions, and six have 
in their mandates activities explicitly or implicitly related to SSR. Of these six 
missions, three (UNAMA, UNSOM and UNSMIL) have in their mandates an 
explicit or implicit task in mine action. 
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Table 3: UN special political/peacebuilding missions159
 • UNAMA is mandated to support the Afghan government in taking full 
“leadership and ownership in security governance”.164 Concerning mine action, 
the mission’s role is expressed through the monitoring and coordination of 
activities in the protection of civilians and the coordination of all UN agencies 
and programmes, including those supporting mine action.165 
 • UNSOM is tasked to support the federal government of Somalia and the 
African Union Mission in Somalia with strategic policy advice on “security 
sector reform, rule of law (including police, justice and corrections within 
the framework of the United Nations Global Focal Point), disengagement of 
combatants, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, maritime security 





















UN Assistance Mission  
in Afghanistan
– – X – – X160 X
UNAMI
UN Assistance Mission 
for Iraq
– – – X161 – – –
UNIOGBIS
UN Integrated Peace-
building Office in  
Guinea–Bissau
– – X – – – –
UNOCA 
UN Regional Office for 
Central Africa
– – – – – – –
UNOWA
UN Office of the Special 
Representative of the 
Secretary –General for 
West Africa
– – X – – – –
UNRCCA
UN Regional Centre for 
Preventive Diplomacy for 
Central Asia
– – – – – – –
UNSCOL
Office of the UN Special 
Coordinator for Lebanon
– – – – – – –
UNSMIL
UN Support Mission  
in Libya
– X – X162 X – X
UNSOM
UN Assistance Mission  
in Somalia
– X163 X – X – X
Total 0 2 4 2 2 1 3
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 • UNSMIL provides “support to key Libyan institutions”167 and continues its 
efforts in defence and police by “engaging national security forces and armed 
groups to encourage their participation in the dialogue process, and in ongoing 
preparatory work on new security arrangements”.168 UNSMIL also “continues 
to convene regular international coordination meetings on Libyan defence 
sector reform in Tunis”.169 In mine action, UNSMIL contributes to “securing 
uncontrolled arms and related material and countering its proliferation”170 and 
implements measures of Resolution 2144 (2014), including to control “arms and 
related materiel in Libya and counter their proliferation, by working to arrange 
access, ensure proper management, safe storage and, where appropriate, 
effective disposal of arms and related materiel, [and] to support coherent partner 
effort in this regard, including coordination and facilitation of international 
assistance”.171
These figures confirm the important role that SSR plays in peacebuilding and 
its political nature. Concerning mine action, missions’ tasks are focused on 
protection of civilians and control, storage and disposal of arms and ammunition, 
and promoting a broader view of mine action by including activities such as PSSM. 
However, as for the peacekeeping missions, political/peacebuilding missions 
provide a limited linkage between SSR and mine action.
Overall, out of 25 peacekeeping and political/peacebuilding missions, ten 
have SSR and mine action in their mandates, but SSR and mine action seem to 
be conducted in parallel and follow a “division of labour” instead of operating 
jointly. The overlap occurs mainly in relation to PSSM, as shown by the mandates 
of MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNOCI and UNSMIL. These missions seem to be 
the only ones suggesting a stronger connection between SSR and mine action 
to promote stabilization of the country. MINUSCA’s mandate speaks directly 
of “incorporating” PSSM in SSR; MONUSCO relies on UNMAS for support in 
capacity building that should help stabilization and national ownership; and finally 
UNSOM is tasked to provide “strategic advice” in both SSR and mine action. 
This paper does not propose that mine action should be merged with SSR. 
Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that in the mandates the linkages are limited, 
as there is no indication of possible connections at the level of normative and 
governance dimensions. Ultimately, the mandates do not reflect the potential 
synergies that were identified in the previous sections and would be beneficial for 
both SSR and mine action172 and the achievement of missions’ goals.
In addition, a better use of potential synergies would support missions in 
addressing the challenges identified by the 2013 UN Secretary-General’s report 
on SSR. This report says that despite the progress made, SSR still needs to go 
beyond a “pillar approach” and undertake “sector-wide interventions”.173 It also 
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highlights that SSR faces the challenge of contributing to long-term security 
through reforms and at the same time to “immediate security delivery through, 
for example, community-oriented policing, justice delivery and small arms and 
light weapons control”.174 Finally, the report underscores that SSR needs “to be 
linked to a broader set of practice areas”.175
In relation to these challenges, this paper argues that enhanced linkage with 
mine action can support SSR in dealing with the provision of security in both 
short and long terms. In the short term, mine action can strengthen SSR through 
not only PSSM but also all its core activities. In particular, the overlap between 
SSR and the five constitutive pillars of mine action176 could be more strongly 
stated, especially for victim assistance and MRE, which reflect human security 
concerns. 
In the long term, support to SSR is possible in two ways. First, mine action 
demands the development of institutions, policies and a legal framework for 
programmes dealing with mines, ERW and cluster munitions. In this regard, closer 
cooperation between SSR and mine action would contribute to effectiveness and 
accountability of the security sector and would be a step in preventing relapse into 
conflict.177 Second, the pillars of victim assistance, MRE and advocacy are related 
to human rights and create a link with reconciliation and justice components. The 
relevance of these pillars is based on mine-action-related conventions that require 
States Parties to provide assistance to victims; on the Maputo Action Plan that 
demands integration of such assistance into the national legal frameworks;178 and 
on the CCM that mentions the need for age- and gender-sensitive assistance.179 
Moreover, the three pillars promote the development of civil society and its 
role as an active actor in the oversight of the security sector. These three pillars 
rely on the involvement of civil society organizations for raising awareness on 
people’s rights, assisting mine victims, conducting training in risk education and 
building support for the conventions. Ultimately, the pillars have the potential 
to contribute to SSR by supporting local ownership and accountability and 
improving effectiveness by addressing people’s security concerns. 
National ownership and capacity development 
As seen in the second section, national ownership is a central principle in mine 
action and has been referred to as “a cornerstone” of the APMBC and IMAS.180 
Increasing numbers of countries affected by mines and ERW are approaching 
completion181 of identifying and clearing all known contaminated areas, thereby 
transitioning from a phase of predominantly proactive survey and clearance 
activities to one of reactive response to reported threats. This transition means 
that concepts related to national capacity development and national ownership 
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become more central, as there is a greater focus on sustainable national capacities 
to manage residual contamination,182 rather than relying on internationally 
funded operators to carry out the work. The transition to a reactive approach 
also means that mine action capacities may be reduced in size and integrated in 
broader security structures such as the military or the police, thus interaction will 
increase in the future between mine action and security providers which may not 
have been involved during the proactive phase of mine action.
A limited number of mine-affected countries have enjoyed full national 
ownership of their mine action programmes from the very onset of survey and 
clearance activities. Nicaragua is a rare example of this: the Nicaraguan army 
cleared all minefields while benefiting from support from the Organization 
of American States (OAS). In most countries, however, it is predominantly 
international mine action organizations that implement proactive survey and 
clearance activities, with marginal or no involvement of national operators 
and national police and army. In several cases UNMAS and UNDP coordinate 
mine action programmes on behalf of affected countries. This underlines the 
importance of developing national capacities and ownership. 
An example of successful capacity development and collaboration between 
SSR and mine action can be found in Liberia, illustrating how UNMAS 
implemented capacity development training with the national security providers 
and, with its implementing partner, collaborated effectively with several SSR 
stakeholders. 
The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberia National Police (LNP) 
committed serious crimes against the civilian population during the 14-year civil 
war, resulting in little trust in the national security services. Recognizing this, 
key stakeholders in the Comprehensive Peace Accord process acknowledged the 
importance of reforming the security sector by including SSR in the August 2003 
agreement. 
As a result, UNMIL was established in September 2003 with a number of 
tasks related to SSR, including assisting Liberia’s transitional government in 
monitoring and restructuring the LNP and forming a new and restructured AFL. 
Furthermore, UNMIL was responsible for responding to hazardous threats and 
carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)183 of residual contamination. 
The transition plan outlining the transfer of responsibilities from UNMIL to the 
Liberian government foresaw that, by 2015, UNMIL’s military capacity would be 
reduced to one engineering unit with EOD capacity, and that EOD responsibili-
ties should be handed over to the AFL that same year.184 
Given the gradual reduction of UNMIL troops and the resulting decline 
in EOD capacity, a 2011 internal UNMIL gap assessment identified the need 
to develop national EOD capacity. On this basis, UNMIL requested UNMAS 
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to support transitioning the EOD response from UNMIL to national security 
services. UNMAS established a project in mid-2013 with the objective of training 
32 AFL members as EOD operators.185 
While significant training targeting the AFL had been under way in Liberia 
for several years, it was only when UNMAS established its presence there in 2013 
that activities related to national clearance capacity development truly started. 
After successfully completing the training, AFL personnel carried out one EOD 
task in 2013 and nine in the first four months of 2014, a clear indication of the 
AFL’s strengthened capacity to respond to and address residual contamination.186 
Stockpiles of conventional weapons such as mines and cluster munitions have 
traditionally been the responsibility of the armed forces. Stockpile destruction 
is therefore another thematic area where SSR and mine action interact on the 
ground, and several examples illustrate how mine action organizations work with 
national armies in such processes. The engagement of Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA), one of the biggest mine action operators globally, is a prominent example 
in this context and warrants closer analysis. NPA has developed the Self-Help 
Ammunition Destruction Options Worldwide (SHADOW) programme that seeks 
to assist states with the timely destruction of their cluster munition stockpiles. The 
programme responds to a clear need to identify safe, practical and cost-effective 
solutions for local and national small-scale cluster munition stockpile destruction. 
The first national self-help project was undertaken in Moldova in 2010, designed 
by NPA and the Moldovan Ministry of Defence (MOD). While the demolition 
stage of the process was entirely controlled by and the responsibility of the MOD 
and the national army, NPA developed capacities and provided supervision to 
army personnel for the disassembly stage of the destruction process.187 The imple-
mentation phase resulted in the destruction of Moldova’s cluster bomb stockpiles 
in just 17 days.188 As of November 2014, NPA had implemented SHADOW 
projects in Croatia, Macedonia, Mozambique and Serbia and is planning activities 
in additional countries. 
NPA notes that national ownership is a precondition for the successful 
implementation of SHADOW activities, as they depend on close collaboration 
and coordination with senior representatives of national governments and 
security providers.189 NPA emphasizes that it is critical to secure high-level 
political commitment at the national level, and to identify “national champions” 
on which the organization can rely. NPA believes that its notable involvement in 
the CCM at the international political level has facilitated its strong relationships 
with several CCM States Parties. These have in turn been instrumental for the 
successful implementation of SHADOW. 
Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to expectations, NPA has not experienced 
any particular challenges during its interactions with national militaries in 
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implementation of activities, and points out that working closely with these 
militaries has been a very positive experience.190 The fact that NPA receives 
SHADOW-related requests from the highest government levels, including from 
senior representatives of ministries of defence and foreign affairs, means that a 
high-level commitment is secured from the outset.
The SHADOW programme is an interesting example of an international 
mine action NGO providing capacity development support to national security 
services, thereby strengthening national ownership of the destruction process 
while contributing to fulfilling obligations under international law. 
Good governance: Transparency, accountability and effectiveness
As seen in the previous sections, mine action conventions and IMAS create a 
solid international framework composed of both legal and non-legal norms. 
There is thus significant potential for joint work between SSR and mine action 
based on their shared commitment to the principles of good governance. In 
particular, better links between these two communities of practice would, on the 
one hand, improve transparency, accountability and effectiveness of mine action 
institutions and programmes; on the other hand, they would make SSR more 
comprehensive by better including mine action, which has the potential to be 
more than a related process, as indicated in the standard representation of SSR 
(illustrated in Figure 1), because in some post-conflict contexts it can actually be 
one of the most relevant security issues.
Despite this potential for synergies, SSR and mine action programmes do 
not interact significantly on good governance issues. While some examples from 
the field illustrate the interest in nurturing interlinkages between SSR and mine 
action, they equally show that there is currently limited cooperation among these 
two communities of practice. 
Nepal is a case in point to underscore that the effectiveness of mine action is 
at some point undermined by the lack of a proper institutional set-up ensuring 
transparency and civilian oversight. This is well documented in a study by the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)191 that 
analyses the achievements and challenges in establishing mine action institutions 
in the aftermath of the civil war. The study notes that despite the important 
accomplishment of freeing the country from the threat of mines and developing 
capacity for addressing the remaining threat from IEDs, mine action in Nepal has 
had some limitations. 
In particular, the analysis points out that Nepal lacks “the institutional 
architecture for a national mine action programme under civilian coordination and 
oversight”.192 The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction was supposed to become 
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the civilian centre for coordination and oversight of national programmes, but 
failed to assume this role because it lacked the capacities in information and quality 
management. In addition, the Mine Action Steering Committee did not adopt a 
national mine action strategy, failed to develop national standards and guidelines, 
and became as ineffective as the Mine Action Joint Working Group – a body 
responsible for coordination between civilian and security actors in mine action.193
Due to the lack of civilian institutions, mine action has remained essentially 
in the hands of the Nepal Army (NA), and this is not without consequences. 
The NA Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) has retained the capacity 
to use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),194 but 
data on victims are not included because the NA maintains that it does not have 
any mandate for tracking victims. Data on victims have instead been kept by 
the human rights NGO Informal Sector Service,195 which does not have IMSMA 
capacity. Therefore, data on mines and mine-related incidents entered into 
IMSMA are neither comprehensive nor complete.
In addition, information requests about mine incidents have to be addressed 
to NAMACC and must follow military channels, which is an obstacle for demands 
from civilian organizations. According to the authors of the study, only a new 
constitution and a significant SSR process would create the necessary space for a 
reconfiguration of the institutional responsibilities in mine action.196
The example of Nepal provides a number of lessons. First, it demonstrates 
that the broader governance of the security sector has an important influence 
on the overall management of mine action. In fact, the NA control over mine 
action is related to the incompleteness of the reforms included in the peace 
agreements.197 Second, the lack of civilian leadership undermines not only 
mine action accountability but also its effectiveness, as information sharing is 
weakened. Consequently, SSR is seen as a key process for improving mine action 
institutions and programmes. 
The importance of the governance dimension is also demonstrated by the 
case of Ukraine, which is confronted with a contamination problem from past 
conflicts, excessive stockpiles from the Soviet era and new contamination from 
mines and unexploded ordnance due to the crisis in its eastern and southeastern 
regions.198 
In Ukraine there is no single body in charge of mine action at the time of 
writing and responsibilities are distributed among a number of institutions. The 
main institution is the State Emergency Service (SES), which is currently under 
the Ministry of Interior199 but in the past it was a ministry in itself. Alongside the 
SES, there is the MOD with the armed forces’ engineer corps, border guards and 
the Ministry of Infrastructure with its Special Transportation Service in charge of 
clearing transport infrastructure such as railways and highways. This situation 
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creates important challenges in terms of coordination, duplication of capacities 
and lack of clarity about responsibilities for clearance.200 
The Ukrainian state is aware of these challenges, and has started drafting 
a mine action law to establish a single body responsible for mine action. This 
process is complicated by the current conflict, which makes it difficult to separate 
humanitarian from military demining activities clearly. A presidential decree 
has assigned mine action activities to the MOD,201 and the MOD is reluctant to 
relinquish its responsibilities to a civilian body as some activities related to mine 
action are perceived to be a matter of national security. Particularly sensitive are 
the sharing of information and access to areas close to the front lines.
Ukraine has received assistance in dealing with mines in the past, and 
the current conflict has increased the international presence in both SSR 
and mine action. The European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security 
Sector Reform was established in July 2014 with a mandate to provide advisory, 
mentoring and support services to law enforcement agencies (police, border 
guards, national guard, penitentiary and security service), the judiciary and 
public prosecution, and also includes cross-cutting aspects like anti-corruption, 
human rights, public administration reform and strategic communication.202 In 
June 2015 the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster was established under the chair of 
UNDP and the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and gathers state authorities 
and international actors working in mine action.203 DDG is active in MRE, 
surveys and building demining capacities.204 The Swiss Foundation for Mine 
Action and the International Trust Fund for Human Security are also active in 
MRE.205 In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (OSCE PCU) has been in the country since 
1999 and has helped Ukraine in enhancing its security, legislation, institutions 
and practices according to democratic standards to build “a secure environment 
for its people”.206 In mine action specifically, the OSCE PCU has supported the 
Ukrainian SES in developing its capacities.207 NATO has been active in support 
of the destruction of landmines, SALW, ammunition and human-portable 
air-defence systems through its Trust Fund.208 
Despite the significance of this international presence, there is limited 
interaction between SSR and mine action with few exceptions. The sub-cluster 
members provided comments on the draft law in July 2015.209 The GICHD, in 
partnership with the OSCE PCU and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), organized a conference to support Ukraine in 
the establishment of mine action institutions and continues to provide assistance 
on this matter.210 This activity has proven the relevance of good governance in mine 
action, because the establishment of a single effective, accountable and civilian 
agency in mine action would produce several benefits including the capacity to:
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 • address issues of information gathering and sharing on contamination;
 • build local capacities;
 • facilitate coordination with international stakeholders; 
 • facilitate fundraising.
However, this GICHD, DCAF and OSCE PCU initiative is an isolated case and 
faces the challenges of bridging communities that usually do not interact. Mine 
action actors are more focused on operational matters such as the delivery of MRE 
and marking and clearing land, and tend to leave institutional development to 
other actors. Overall, the Ukraine case confirms that the mine action community 
of practice has margin to enhance its engagement in good governance issues, 
and SSR can provide valuable assistance to mine action by introducing a more 
political- and conflict-sensitive analysis. 
People-centred approach and human rights
Not many concrete examples were found where SSR and mine action contribute 
jointly – directly or indirectly – to the protection and promotion of human rights. 
But one case in point relates to efforts undertaken in the CAR since 2014 under 
the umbrella of MINUSCA, of which UNMAS, human rights and SSR are 
components. 
The history of violations of IHL and human rights in the CAR is tragically rich, 
involving both security forces and armed groups. The need for SSR goes far back, 
but in the aftermath of elections in 2005, when General Bozizé was elected two 
years after seizing power, violence took on a new momentum with the political and 
security dysfunctions of the state continuing to threaten stability and legitimacy. 
Armed groups challenged state power, and regular forces – including the Forces 
armées centrafricaines (FACA) – carried out security-sapping activities, including 
gross human rights abuses. It was also the time when the need to start thinking 
about the structural causes of conflict, including the set-up and functioning of the 
entire security system, was increasingly recognized. In 2008 SSR efforts to reform 
the FACA and other security providers began. These attempts largely failed before, 
but also in light of, the resumption of large-scale violence in 2012.211 
In late 2012 violence resumed between the mainly Muslim Séléka rebel 
coalition and the government, and did not cease despite the 2013 Libreville peace 
agreement between the Bozizé government and the rebels. After the ousting of 
President Bozizé by the Séléka in March 2013, a transitional government took 
office. Conflict became more and more sectarian between the Séléka and the 
mainly Christian anti-Balaka movement, which led the UN Secretary-General to 
warn of the risk of a sectarian partition of the CAR.212 Across the country security 
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deteriorated, leading to weak government authority and control over national 
territory, human right abuses with total impunity and a severe humanitarian 
and protection crisis, with civilians being targeted by all armed groups. Security 
forces have contributed to general insecurity and committed numerous human 
rights violations against civilians.213 Under these circumstances, the UN Security 
Council took action by establishing MINUSCA in March 2014. 
Accountability and justice measures are recognized as essential in any peace 
and reconciliation process and to prevent ongoing violations in the short term.214 
Thus in the mandate of MINUSCA the Security Council stressed the need to 
end impunity and bring to justice perpetrators of violations and abuses – hence 
the critical role of SSR, specifically recognized by the Security Council215 – and 
to disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and repatriate (DDRR) former combatants 
and armed elements. This imperative also applies to security forces, which, 
as described above, have a record of human rights abuses. As a consequence, 
MINUSCA supports SSR processes.216 Vetting for human rights and other abuses 
has become a precondition for integration into the army.217 
Similarly, the Security Council mandated MINUSCA to support the 
transitional authorities to “address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation, 
and misuse of small arms and light weapons in the CAR, and to ensure the safe 
and effective management, storage and security of stockpiles of small arms 
and light weapons”.218 Surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons and 
ammunition should also be collected and destroyed. UNMAS, being the UN focal 
point for mine action, assumes these responsibilities. 
The deteriorated security situation has in fact facilitated the circulation of 
large quantities of weapons, obsolete ammunition and small arms ammunition. 
The UN recorded that 83 per cent of the obsolete ammunition and explosive 
remnants and 99 per cent of ammunition holdings had disappeared from 
inspected stockpiles between December 2012 and November 2013.219 Related 
to these humanitarian and security risks, and at the same time contributing to 
them, large quantities of ammunition are poorly stored and managed. 
On this basis UNMAS supports PSSM, which in the CAR implies the 
construction of safe and secured armouries and ammunition depots.220 As a 
concrete example, on 27 April 2015 MINUSCA, through UNMAS and under the 
guidance of SSR, initiated the construction of a permanent armoury in Camp 
Kassaï with the capacity to store 1,000 weapons.221 The armoury will help the 
transitional authorities to control the illicit transfer of arms better while ensuring 
their marking and safe management.222 This effort is part of the strategy to 
reconstruct the armed forces.
The Security Council clearly stressed that these weapons-related activities 
should be incorporated into SSR and DDR/DDRR programmes.223 The call for 
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integration rests on the wider recognition of the links between national SALW 
management, reduction of armed violence, human rights issues and SSR.224 
The support provided by UNMAS to the transitional government in the CAR 
is a case in point of how these interlinkages can be effectively implemented. 
The respective activities of UNMAS and the SSR and human rights units of 
the mission are coordinated under the pillar of the political Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General; while UNMAS is mandated to support 
weapons and ammunition management, the SSR unit addresses structural and 
governance challenges. 
Human rights violations and abuses are a major concern in the CAR, and 
the need for bold action against impunity and in vetting security sector personnel 
is significant. Furthermore, in accordance with its human rights due diligence 
policy, the UN is obliged to withdraw support from security actors who commit 
human rights violations or fail to address them.225 The issue of constructing 
armouries might possibly be wisely used to leverage increased focus by the 
transitional government on human rights due diligence within its security sector. 
Such commitment, as well as the safety of storage sites, might also be considered 
under certain circumstances as among the prerequisites for the return of collected 
weapons to the transitional government. In his statement on the occasion of the 
opening of the construction site at Camp Kassaï, Under-Secretary-General Hervé 
Ladsous at least finely alluded to this when praising in this context the initiatives 
of the MOD and the general staff to develop an operational army that is irre-
proachable and responding increasingly to international norms.226
While this remark might seem anecdotal, it perfectly illustrates the interplay 
between broader mine action and SSR on the ground, and how the operational-
ization of such linkages can inform and contribute indirectly to the promotion 
of human rights. It is argued that such successful cross-fertilization among 
domains has the potential to be more widely explored when the specific political 
and operational circumstances on the ground allow.
As for human rights, research has shown that while each domain focuses 
extensively on integrating and mainstreaming gender and diversity in its 
respective operations, concrete joint projects are missing. The question therefore 
arises of whether stronger cooperation on this matter is relevant on the ground. 
As demonstrated conceptually, gender and diversity are cross-cutting issues with 
importance for both SSR and mine action, particularly in relation to institutions, 
recruitment, planning and delivery of support. Only when being inclusive can 
SSR and mine action be effective and achieve the greatest impact. Collecting and 
analysing gender-disaggregated data also represent important tasks of both SSR 
and mine action projects on the ground. 
48 Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard
The common interest in the topic and the benefits from synergies of cooperation 
have started to be recognized, at least at headquarters level, as testified by an 
initiative of several Geneva-based organizations active in peace and security. 
In January 2015 a collaboration between DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy, the GICHD, Small Arms Survey and the Gender and Mine Action 
Programme, which are all housed at the Maison de la paix premises, resulted 
in the establishment of the Maison de la paix Gender and Diversity Hub. The 
strength of this initiative consists in bringing together under one umbrella the 
gender and diversity expertise of each organization in its specific thematic field 
and capitalizing on the resulting synergies, increased outreach and impact. 
Given that promoting gender equality and diversity are integral both to SSR 
and mine action (and to other related fields such as SALW and security policy) and 
that, in some instances, both domains work with the same or similar stakeholders, 
it can be reasonably argued that joint delivery of gender and diversity support 
and advice lead to increased understanding of the gender- and diversity-related 
linkages for broader security and improved SSR and mine action programmes. 
The activities of the Gender and Diversity Hub will provide an opportunity to 
assess whether this assumption holds true.  
Broadening mandates: Mine action organizations and security providers
After reviewing the operationalization – or lack thereof – of conceptual 
commonalities between SSR and mine action, this subsection adds a further 
analytical layer to the linkages between the SSR and mine action communities 
by examining how the trend for mine action organizations to broaden their 
activities has led to increased interaction with the security sector and whether 
this interaction has already or may in future yield synergies. 
This trend is driven by the recognition that, in some contexts, expertise and 
capacities of mine action organizations are relevant and applicable to respond 
to needs in fields of activities beyond core mine action.227 Interaction with these 
other domains brings the potential to contribute significantly to a response which 
is more efficient, better targeted and has greater impact. Another factor that has 
prompted mine action organizations to broaden their support is their proven 
ability to work in unstable and conflict-affected contexts. This type of expertise 
has enabled them to work in environments of multiple risks where SALW, IEDs 
and ammunition often pose additional and mutually reinforcing threats. 
Other key factors are normative and diplomatic developments in recent 
years on SALW control, ammunition management and linking armed violence 
and development. Examples include the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme 
of Action on SALW control,228 regional agreements such as the 2006 Economic 
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Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, the IATG, ISACS and 
the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. These instruments 
have provided mine action organizations with an important framework to assess 
and offer, where applicable, broader assistance to states. Requests for support 
have often been facilitated by the relationships established and trust developed 
between states and organizations during traditional mine action operations. 
The following paragraphs highlight a series of cases in which previously 
traditional mine action organizations have started to address broader threats to 
security: the OAS SALW and ammunition destruction programme in Guatemala, 
DDG’s Community Safety Programme in Uganda, a PSSM project undertaken 
by UNMAS and HALO Trust in Côte d’Ivoire and HALO Trust’s involvement in 
DDR in Afghanistan. These projects were selected for their strong interaction 
with security forces and SSR processes. 
Firstly, the broadening of their fields of activities led mine action organizations 
to deal with the destruction of SALW and ammunition, exemplified by OAS 
engagement in Guatemala. In that country more than 200,000 people were 
killed and many more subjected to human rights violations during the 36-year 
internal armed conflict.229 Since the 1996 peace accords donors have invested 
significant amounts of money in security and justice reform, but with little 
result. Guatemala remains one of the most violent countries in the world, with 
a homicide rate of 34 per 100,000 persons in 2013, twice the Latin American 
average.230 The level of violence and prevailing sense of insecurity are exacerbated 
by a lack of police capacity and mistrust of government security forces in many 
sectors of Guatemalan society.231 Guatemala has also become a regional hub for 
the trafficking of SALW and ammunition. 
Following a fire in 2005 at a military ammunition storage depot containing 
highly volatile white phosphorus based within densely populated Guatemala City, 
the white phosphorus was stored in temporary bunkers. For five years no action 
was taken to address the underlying problem, and the phosphorus continued 
to deteriorate. This increasingly posed an environmental and security threat, 
along with the fear that other ammunition depots in urban areas were at risk of 
igniting. Thus the Guatemalan military identified the need to reduce the risk of 
unplanned explosions and improve its stockpile management capacity. Guatemala 
had significant stocks of ammunition resulting from obsolete weaponry and 
surpluses beyond national defence and security needs.232 
In 2010, when the OAS was approached to assist with destroying the legacy 
of the 2005 accident, it started to support the safe removal and management 
of ammunition.233 This support reflects an internal evolution within the OAS 
which culminated in the establishment of a dedicated programme of assistance 
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for control of arms and ammunition, in addition to its traditional programme for 
comprehensive action against anti-personnel mines. 
An initial survey in 2010 carried out by the OAS and its contractor Golden 
West, an expert humanitarian NGO, concluded that 600 tons required destruction, 
much of which consisted of excess, expired and obsolete ammunition.234 With 
inadequate stockpile management, excess weapons and ammunition cannot be 
identified and pose a grave year-to-year risk.235 However, Guatemala, like other 
countries in the region, lacked capacity, especially in the Ordnance Service of 
the Ministry of National Defence in charge of munitions storage facilities. In 
response to this need, the OAS assisted the military in identifying, transporting 
and eliminating both small- and large-calibre explosive ammunition located in 
military storage sites in densely populated areas, and delivered specialized training 
in destruction and demolition techniques. As a result of the project, Guatemala’s 
problem of excess and obsolete ammunition has largely been addressed.236 
In addition, the OAS started to be involved in SALW destruction. As previously 
mentioned, Guatemala has become a regional hub for SALW trafficking with 
significant levels of illicit arms in circulation. With training, technical and logistical 
assistance, and equipment provided by the OAS, the Guatemalan military has 
worked with the judicial authorities to destroy SALW that were seized. Finally, 
the Guatemalan military has also taken steps to destroy its own supplies of excess 
and obsolete SALW.237 
This OAS project focusing on SALW and ammunition destruction has had 
an important impact on the physical security of ammunition storage sites and 
the availability of SALW. Furthermore, it has greatly contributed to enhancing 
the effectiveness of the security sector. Collaboration between the Guatemalan 
military and the OAS has enhanced the credibility of the military, and of the 
ammunition and SALW destruction process.238 
Engaging with the agents of violence is another example of how mine action 
organizations broaden their mandate, illustrated by DDG’s Community Safety 
Programme in Uganda. The Karamoja region suffers from high levels of conflict 
and insecurity and is one of the most marginalized in Uganda, with 82 per cent 
of the population living below the poverty line.239 The region is characterized 
by protracted interclan conflicts over cattle, grazing land and access to other 
resources. 
The Karamajong are semi-nomadic pastoralists who depend on cattle grazing 
and cattle raiding for their livelihoods. In the 1970s cattle herds were reduced by 
drought and disease, which led to increased raiding. The increased frequency of 
raids led to an increased demand for weapons, for both raiding and defending 
herds. With the growing proliferation of SALW since the 1970s, the lethality of 
interclan cattle raids has increased dramatically. A 2008 estimate indicated that 
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with a small arms death rate of 600 per 100,000, Karamoja has the highest level 
of SALW-related deaths and injuries in Uganda.240 
An assessment conducted by Saferworld revealed rampant abuse by security 
providers, lack of access to them, lack of information on their activities and lack 
of community consultation. Many residents complained that the police were 
not proactive in engaging communities, and people remained unaware of their 
rights.241 In spite of their violent behaviour, communities consider the presence 
of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) as necessary to provide security 
to farms and recover stolen livestock, but they maintain a better relationship with 
local councils and traditional elders.242 
DDG was founded in the late 1990s, initially specializing in clearing landmines 
and unexploded ordnance, but has expanded its activities from traditional mine 
action to include broader initiatives aimed to prompt positive change in the 
agents as well as institutional and cultural environments of violence.243 Active 
in Uganda through a mine/ERW clearance programme in association with the 
UPDF and the Uganda Police Force (UPF) since 2007, DDG decided to expand 
its operations by launching a programme to improve community safety in the 
conflict-prone Karamoja region. With its Community Safety Programme, DDG 
strives to create the preconditions for sustainable development by addressing the 
causes and impacts of instability, conflict and armed violence. It aims especially 
to develop the capacity of communities to mitigate conflict at all levels and the 
capacity of formal security providers to meet the security needs of communities. 
The first phase of the project consists of in-depth consultations with key 
security providers, in particular the UPDF and UPF. Actual implementa-
tion commences upon permission from communities, with the establishment 
of community safety plans. These focus on clarifying participants’ vision of 
community safety and developing an action plan. Community safety committees, 
including elders, women, youth, political leaders and security providers, are then 
responsible for implementing the action plans.244 
Subsequently, conflict management education is delivered alongside efforts 
to strengthen existing formal and informal judicial systems to resolve conflict. 
Education takes place at village level with the participation of about 70–100 
households. DDG is also delivering conflict management education for the 
police and UPDF. Education is complemented by SALW sensitization, which is a 
sensitive issue as SALW ownership is illegal in Uganda and also because govern-
ment-sponsored forced disarmament campaigns, implemented by the UPDF, 
have involved extrajudicial executions and torture of the Karamajong.245 
Finally, in response to past abuse and human rights violations by security 
forces, DDG facilitates regular meetings between community representatives 
and their main security providers. At the end of these meetings, resolutions 
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are agreed and signed by all participants. Examples of issues discussed include 
the mistreatment of people by the UPF and UPDF, rapes by security providers 
and the wearing of traditional scarves by young warriors, which security forces 
believed were concealing SALW.246 
DDG’s Community Safety Programme has clearly had a significant 
positive impact. Regular meetings between communities and security providers 
contributed to reduced violence. What is more, in 2010 27.7 per cent of participating 
community members in five parishes stated that their trust in the police was very 
good. This figure increased to 41.1 per cent in 2011.247 Slight improvements in the 
relationship between communities and the UPDF were also recorded. Security 
providers have noted that community members have become more open about 
reporting cases, and communities have stated that the security providers have 
become more sensitive when dealing with them.248 
While some mine action organizations have addressed the agents of armed 
violence, as illustrated in DDG’s Community Safety Programme, their broadening 
support mainly relates thus far to PSSM. This new field of activity is illustrated by 
a joint UNMAS–HALO Trust project in Côte d’Ivoire. 
In 2002 Côte d’Ivoire started to endure conflict between the north, which 
was held by rebels, and the south, controlled by then President Laurent Gbabgo’s 
forces. Violence rose significantly following the 2010 presidential elections, when 
intense fighting broke out between Gbabgo and election winner Ouattara. During 
these long years of conflict, armouries and ammunition depots were looted and 
damaged across the country and a significant amount of arms and ammunition 
got into civilian and militia hands. According to the Small Arms Survey, the 
number of illicit arms in circulation increased considerably during the crisis.249 
Following the crisis, the UN received reports that mines had been laid along 
the line of confidence which divided the north and south of the country. The 
chief of the UNOCI DDR Division contacted UNMAS for assistance to confirm 
whether there was contamination. Beyond confirming unexploded ordnance 
and IED contamination, the initial assessment also highlighted a problem with 
abandoned ordnance, while noting that arms and ammunition in Republican 
Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), gendarmerie and police depots and armouries 
had been looted. UNOCI DDR therefore asked UNMAS to increase ammunition 
storage safety.250 As a result of UN Security Council Resolution 2000 (2011), 
UNMAS established a programme reporting to the DDR–SSR Division aiming 
to contribute to “protection and security”, including via SALW collection and 
disposal, for the stabilization and reconstruction of the country.251 
An institutional set-up was therefore put in place fostering close interaction 
between UNMAS and the SSR and DDR activities of UNOCI. This temporary252 
location of UNMAS under the DDR–SSR chapeau was considered helpful, especially 
53 Linking Mine Action and SSR through Human Security
to facilitate UNMAS access to security forces. Nonetheless, this example also sheds 
light on the need to create initial awareness and a shared understanding among the 
mine action, DDR and SSR communities after deployment to a mission.253 
A national assessment of 56 police, gendarmerie and FRCI weapons and 
ammunition storage facilities between October 2011 and the end of June 2012 
indicated that all sites would require significant improvements and that, if 
management practices were not enhanced, large-scale explosions could occur. 
The assessment revealed that in many cases ammunition was stored in buildings 
that were not originally designed as ammunition storage facilities and did not 
meet international standards.254 
This assessment informed planning for the establishment of secure 
temporary stores and the rehabilitation and future management of the regular 
sites. Hence, among other activities, UNMAS supports UNOCI’s SSR mandate by 
developing capacities of the national security forces to rehabilitate and refurbish 
their armouries and ammunition storage areas and developing their required 
technical expertise for efficient management of such sites.255 
To achieve this objective, UNMAS contracted the NGO HALO Trust to 
implement a PSSM programme. Since then, HALO Trust and UNMAS have 
worked closely with the Ivorian authorities to build or renovate more than 190 
stores and armouries and develop capacities of the security forces in safe weapons 
and ammunition management and destruction.256 
While Côte d’Ivoire is another good example of capacity development, it also 
illustrates that support to address the threats of unsecured and/or inadequately 
managed stockpiles has created valuable synergies between UNMAS and SSR.257 
In 2013 UNOCI rightly pointed out that it would be of great importance to include 
PSSM in the drafting of the national defence policy.258 Finally, it is a testimony 
to increased interaction between mine action organizations and broader security 
providers. In fact, the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the security forces, 
recognizing the risks posed by unsecured arms and ammunition, established a 
national PSSM working group which meets monthly and is chaired by the head of 
the FRCI Logistics Division. Beyond its purpose of exchanging good practice on 
PSSM, the group serves as a platform for planning and meeting training needs. 
UNMAS and HALO Trust are members of the group, as are representatives of the 
armed forces, gendarmerie and police.259
Before turning to interaction between SSR and mine action via DDR, it is 
worth noting that it is not a given that mine action organizations involved in 
PSSM are able to create linkages to SSR. A case in point is the experience of 
the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Burundi. From 2007 to 2013 MAG 
worked with the Burundian police and army to develop their capacities to secure 
and manage their SALW stockpiles safely. MAG also trained army personnel to 
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destroy surplus and obsolete weapons and ammunition.260 By enhancing the 
capacity of armourers in the management of SALW and storage sites, MAG 
certainly contributed to the professionalization of the country’s security and 
defence forces. It also made several attempts to link its PSSM support to wider 
SSR. However, it experienced challenges in engaging with SSR stakeholders on 
the ground. It appears that, at the time of MAG’s PSSM project in Burundi, the 
wider SSR community considered that PSSM fell outside the scope of SSR.261 
Securing financial support for MAG’s PSSM project from SSR donors 
proved to be equally challenging. Especially the Netherlands has been very active 
in supporting SSR in Burundi, not least since the establishment of the Burundi–
Netherlands Security Sector Development programme262 in 2009. The programme 
has proven instrumental to build momentum towards greater transparency and 
accountability, and has been recognized as having the potential to lead effectively 
to governance results.263 MAG was initially included in the first two-year block 
of programme projects with the Burundian police. However, funding for MAG’s 
PSSM activities was discontinued, since the Netherlands no longer considered 
PSSM to be part of its wider SSR priorities. The weak link between PSSM and 
SSR was also articulated in Burundi’s 2012–2015 strategic plan for SSR, in which 
PSSM figures only minimally.264
As a final example of the increasing involvement of mine action organizations 
in related fields of activity, the paper sheds light on the linkages between SSR and 
mine action on the ground through DDR. The success of SSR projects is often 
linked to effective demilitarization, and some authors argue that DDR and SSR 
should be planned, resourced, implemented and evaluated together.265 As the 
following example mainly focuses on mine action organizations’ efforts in the 
reintegration aspect of DDR, it is worth highlighting that successful reintegration 
directly contributes to the shared DDR–SSR objective of ensuring effective and 
sustainable transition of former combatants to civilian life. Failed reintegration 
can undermine SSR by putting pressure on police, courts and prisons, in addition 
to representing a security threat for the state and communities.266
Hence it seems logical that in Afghanistan DDR has been conceived as a 
pillar in SSR following the adoption of a peacebuilding and political transition 
roadmap – the Bonn Agreement – in late 2001.267 In this context, Afghanistan’s 
New Beginnings Programme used demining training as a way to reintegrate 
former combatants from the Afghan military forces into civilian life between 
2004 and 2006. The steady income and benefits proved attractive to former 
combatants who were reintegrated into the workforce: 75 per cent were still 
working as deminers one month after the end of the programme, demonstrating 
an encouraging retention potential within mine action.268
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In the subsequent Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), 
started in 2010, much weight was again put on reintegration, this time aimed 
at insurgents. Mine action’s contribution to DDR falls within the third phase of 
reintegration, which is designed to demonstrate to communities the benefits of 
maintaining peace.269 
The APRP refers reintegrees to participating demining agencies after they 
have been vetted, enrolled and provided with a stipend for transition assistance. 
By including both former insurgents and non-combatants, the APRP is careful 
not to “reward” those who participated in conflict or to exacerbate tensions 
within the community. Very importantly, reintegrees begin receiving a salary 
from day one of demining training, immediately relieving pressure to return to 
conflict for monetary reasons. In 2010 HALO Trust started to employ former 
combatants as deminers, and thus to support DDR explicitly. This initiative was 
based on HALO Trust’s belief that by promoting peace and stability in its areas of 
operation, it would be able to perform its core activities better while at the same 
time contributing to broader peacebuilding goals. When reintegrees graduate 
from the training, they are assigned to demining teams that are deployed in the 
same way as all other HALO Trust teams.270 
Many other APRP activities require a significant timespan to demonstrate 
results to both reintegrees and communities; in contrast, reintegration as deminers 
shows benefits from the first day of training. While demining has remained 
a small component of the overall APRP, it has proven to be an important and 
effective means of demonstrating the benefits of peace. Another added value of 
having reintegrated former combatants in teams alongside community deminers 
is that reconciliation is effectively nurtured. They learn to work together with 
former enemies towards a common goal. Deminers must be able to trust one 
another fully to work safely in the field.271 HALO Trust has reintegrated hundreds 
of former Taliban and Hezbi Islami combatants in Baghlan and Kunduz provinces 
into its demining ranks and trained them as community-based deminers.272 
Assisting directly in DDR initiatives can have repercussions for a neutral 
humanitarian organization such as HALO Trust. The employment of former 
combatants of an ongoing insurgency could be perceived by some as a partisan 
act siding with the government. While some assessments of HALO Trust’s 
involvement in DDR in Afghanistan conclude that the NGO did not encounter any 
specific risks or threats as a result of the reintegration of former combatants,273 
others testify that its employees were perceived as spies and threatened.274 
Although the overall experience was seen as good, this clearly sheds light on the 
new challenges and risks for humanitarian NGOs when engaging in inherently 
political processes and working with former insurgents. As Blaney et al. pointed 
out, “DDR and SSR are political and dangerous efforts as they dismantle the de 
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facto institutions of power in conflict-affected countries. A general or warlord 
may not welcome the suggestion to put down his gun and become a farmer. As 
such, purely technical approaches to DDR and SSR will fail.”275 
It is of course important for an NGO to mitigate these risks, for instance by 
underlining and communicating its neutral and technical work and its benefits 
for communities. Nevertheless, caution and close monitoring are required, 
since reputation and trust are much more easily lost than built.276 Mine action 
organizations may also need to reinforce security measures for this very reason, 
since the risk of attacks against reintegrated fighters may increase.277 In conclusion, 
the example of HALO Trust’s involvement in DDR in Afghanistan illustrates the 
added value of mine action organizations’ contribution to reforming the security 
sector. 
In sum, it can be demonstrated that the common conceptual approaches of 
SSR and mine action are resulting in concrete linkages between both communities 
of practice in some areas, such as capacity development, national ownership and 
the promotion of human rights, while such linkages are largely missing in others, 
as in the case of gender and diversity. While this latter example might highlight 
room for new opportunities, it also raises the fundamental question as to the limits 
of potential synergies. Finally, the trend towards increased interaction between 
mine action organizations and security providers identified in this section might 
not necessarily be a given in all contexts. 
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Conclusion 
This paper focuses on three questions aiming at identifying the linkages between 
SSR and mine action at conceptual and operational levels in post-conflict contexts. 
We show that both SSR and mine action share a common understanding of 
security: human security. This concept broadens the traditional state-centric 
definition of security and adopts a people-centred perspective which encompasses 
human safety, livelihood and dignity.
By focusing on national ownership, accountability and effectiveness, SSR 
aims to create conditions that are conducive not only to state and human security, 
but also to socio-economic development. Similarly, mine action actors have gone 
beyond the immediate removal of mines and ERW for humanitarian purposes 
and expanded their spectrum of activities to contribute to long-term development 
and address wider threats related to conventional weapons. Finally, this pattern 
of a broadening spectrum of activities and the recognition of the interdepend-
encies of risks to state and human security match the qualitative change of UN 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, which today fully integrate SSR and 
mine action where relevant.
The conceptual linkages between SSR and mine action are reflected by 
significant commonalities in their approach to designing and implementing 
programmes. This paper finds that both SSR and mine action programmes 
promote national ownership, give significant attention to the development of 
local capacities and seek to apply the principles of good governance. A people-cen-
tred, rights-based approach is at the core of SSR, not least because SSR mostly 
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takes place in countries in which the security sector may have been a major 
threat to the human rights of its own constituency. A focus on people and human 
rights is also key in mine action, as it is anchored in international conventions 
addressing the humanitarian consequences of mines and ERW. Finally, both SSR 
and mine action mainstream gender equality and diversity, which are considered 
fundamental to ensuring effective, accountable and non-discriminatory provision 
of security. 
Both domains have become components in UN peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions. MINUSCA and UNOCI are good examples testifying to 
the synergies from cooperation between SSR and mine action, with its increasingly 
related domains such as PSSM and SALW. MINUSCA has a mandate to incorporate 
PSSM into SSR and develop capacities in managing SALW. Connecting these 
activities may contribute indirectly to the promotion of human rights. UNOCI 
also gives PSSM an important role in the stabilization of the country. In addition 
to these cases, the paper demonstrates that the broadening involvement of mine 
action actors in related fields of activities has led them to work increasingly with 
DDR and security actors that are traditional stakeholders in SSR programmes. As 
illustrated by several examples, mine action can facilitate SSR by contributing to 
the professionalization of national security and defence forces, and consequently 
support capacity development and ownership. 
Despite these positive trends, this paper also notes that interaction between 
SSR and mine action is still limited at field level. The synergies between them are 
mostly confined to PSSM and do not take advantage of the full spectrum of potential 
activities (mine action’s five pillars) that could be conducted jointly to improve the 
impact of interventions on the ground. In particular, the paper identifies some 
areas in which opportunities for cooperation remain to be explored. 
A potential area of cooperation is promotion of good governance. The example 
of Ukraine, where efforts are being made to support the development of well-
governed, efficient and accountable mine action institutions by combining SSR 
and assistance to mine action, is an illustration of possible synergies. Another 
area is gender and diversity, which is a shared approach and a priority of both 
domains. The recent establishment of the Maison de la paix Gender and Diversity 
Hub in Geneva might be a first and encouraging sign of increasingly joint work 
on this critical aspect.
We recognize that some important differences between SSR and mine action 
render synergies challenging and, consequently, may explain the limitations in 
linking SSR and mine action in post-conflict contexts. A particular challenge is 
to bridge the political dimension of SSR and the humanitarian origin of mine 
action. On the one hand, this paper recognizes that SSR addresses politically 
sensitive issues, especially in post-conflict contexts where state institutions are 
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contested or weak and control over the security sector is key to political influence 
and governance. On the other hand, it stresses that mine action has grown as 
a humanitarian activity abiding by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
independence. This feature has pushed mine action away from sensitive political 
questions and reduced the room for cooperation with SSR. 
Another challenge relates to the strong operational and technical focus 
of mine action, which has at least three consequences. First, it may relegate 
broader security and institutional issues to a second order of priority. Second, 
the technical nature of mine action can overshadow its contribution to security 
governance and, as demonstrated by the case of Burundi, SSR actors may simply 
not perceive it as relevant to SSR. Third, there is often a “time lapse” because 
mine action actors tend to be early on the ground and have their programmes 
and network already established when SSR actors come into play. This renders 
cooperation more difficult, requiring a readjustment of already ongoing mine 
action programmes. 
However, these differences should not undermine strong opportunities for 
enhancing the interaction between SSR and mine action. These opportunities are 
important, since they facilitate the delivery of SSR and mine action support by 
combining expertise and experience. Building bridges and operationalizing the 
shared approaches and objectives will prove valuable to address security issues 
from a broader and more holistic perspective, leading to increased impact and 
effectiveness of interventions. 
Human security could play an important role to bridge divides and strengthen 
the interaction between SSR and mine action. This concept provides a general 
framework in which the specific goals of SSR and mine action are understood as 
contributing to one single goal. The human security concept, with its people-cen-
tred approach and the relevance given to human rights, gender and diversity, is 
instrumental in strengthening the existing common features between SSR and 
mine action.
At a more practical level, the paper identifies specific areas where SSR 
and mine action could benefit from improved cooperation. Mine action could 
contribute to overcoming the challenges identified by the 2013 report of the UN 
Secretary-General on SSR.278 In particular, it could help SSR in bridging short- 
and long-term security provision by dealing with immediate threats from mines 
and ERW, on the one hand, and addressing longer-term challenges through the 
development of local capacities and institutions on the other hand. In addition, 
mine action has a more codified legal-normative framework than does SSR and 
this could be used to leverage issues that are at the core of both mine action 
and SSR agendas. Finally, the need for establishing mine action institutions is a 
potential entry point for SSR programmes.
60 Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard
Moreover, stronger linkages to SSR would be beneficial for a better understanding 
of the broader political and security context in which mine action institutions 
need to be developed. In other words, SSR’s holistic nature complements mine 
action by providing a wider analysis of security needs and capacities. As seen in 
the cases of Nepal and Ukraine, the development of mine action capacities (or 
lack thereof) and their effectiveness are determined by the overall institutional 
security framework. SSR actors could facilitate contact with other national 
security stakeholders that are not among the usual interlocutors for mine action 
organizations but play a role in establishing mine action programmes and 
institutions, such as members of parliament. 
Stronger interaction with security providers and SSR more generally also 
seems to result naturally from recent trends in mine action. First, while many 
mine-affected countries complete their clearance targets or treaty obligations, 
residual contamination may remain to be addressed. Instead of dedicated mine 
action institutions, this task often requires appropriate response capacities 
streamlined into security providers such as the military or police. Second, as 
mine action organizations increasingly address issues such as PSSM or DDR, 
their primary interlocutors may no longer necessarily be humanitarian bodies, 
but security actors. Given the ramifications of such issues in aspects of national 
security, mine action organizations may need to pay more attention to political 
considerations in the future and, as a result, take SSR priorities increasingly into 
account. 
Post-conflict contexts in particular tighten the relationship between SSR and 
mine action for multiple reasons. First, in these environments mines and ERW 
often constitute a severe threat to security and an impediment to development, 
and must be addressed not only in the immediate aftermath of conflict but also 
in the long term to support socio-economic development, access to social services 
and the fulfilment of civic and human rights. Second, mine action requires 
appropriate, effective and accountable institutions which SSR aims also to create. 
Finally, these institutions and programmes involve a plurality of actors, from 
state ministries and agencies to local and international civil society, NGOs and 
corporations. Thus mine action has to address and solve issues and challenges 
that are common to all the other pillars of the security sector. Ultimately, the 
linkages between mine action and SSR demonstrate the importance of better 
articulating the close and sometimes cross-cutting relationship between these 
two agendas in order to improve the theory, policy and practice of post-conflict 
peacebuilding.
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Ursign Hofmann, Gianluca Maspoli, Åsa Massleberg and Pascal Rapillard
Security sector reform (SSR) and mine action share a strong common conceptual basis, which 
draws from a shared understanding of security. They both reflect a conceptualization of security that 
is not limited to the level of the state, but takes into account security threats and needs at societal 
and individual levels. This common basis provides opportunities for synergies between SSR and 
mine action. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that the strong conceptual basis is not fully 
reflected in concrete activities, and the linkages remain limited and underexplored. Despite this 
gap, there are positive examples showing the potential for synergies between SSR and mine action. 
Ultimately, this paper maintains that the concept of human security provides a comprehensive 
framework which can bridge the differences and open broader opportunities for cooperation, which  
in turn will increase the impact of interventions in SSR and mine action.
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